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
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21

PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE

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PROBLEMS OF THE PEACE

BY

WILSON HARRIS

CAMBRIDGE

AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS

1944

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FOREWORD

IT is not my purpose in this entirely unambitious little book to frame anything in the nature of a peace programme—though I have my views on many of the subjects discussed, and here and there they may have come breaking in—but simply to indicate as a basis for public and private argument some of the problems with which a Peace Conference must inevitably concern itself when it meets. Some, not all, of the problems. I have confined myself to the European peace, and about that large and supremely important field of activity falling under the head of economic reconstruction I have said little in detail partly through lack of space, but mainly because those subjects seem unlikely to be handled by the Peace Conference itself. Other bodies, indeed, are already at work—the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration in one sphere and the Allied Nutrition Council* in another, while President Roosevelt has declared that it is to the International Labour Organisation, which has maintained its valuable activities throughout the war, that the world should look ‘as the official international organisation where ideas, experience and movements in the field of labour and social development may find practical and effective expression’. The economic clauses of the Treaty of

* So I call it for convenience; the official name has not yet been fixed.

Versailles amounted to very little; the Peace Conference, realising that concerted and coordinated economic action called for the cooperation of neutrals, and later of ex-enemy countries, left that task to the nascent League of Nations, which in spite of serious political obstacles took it up with vigour and no small success. The same course seems probable this time.

Having followed the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 at as close quarters as was reasonably possible in the strange conditions in which the deliberations there were conducted, and written I suppose some hundreds of thousands of words on it first and last, I have thought it worth while to compare the Paris discussions and decisions with those which are in prospect now, after another victory over the same enemy.* There is, I know, a school of thought which holds that a Peace Conference should not be held till long—perhaps years—after the war ends, or even that by some obscure process a Peace Conference may be dispensed with altogether, all necessary action being taken under the Armistice. Even if that were possible (which it is not, for an armistice is a purely military agreement, in no way adapted for the settlement of political questions) practically everything I have written would stand, for all the problems considered here will have to be discussed somewhere, at some time, by someone. Where I have written ‘at the Peace Conference’ it is rather as a matter of convenience than

* To anyone desiring to study the 1919 Treaty further in this connexion I would commend an admirable little book, *The Treaty of Versailles, Was It Just?*, by Professor T. E. Jessop (Nelson, 5s.).

as implying anything dogmatic about the date or nature of the proceedings.

But that having been said, it is necessary to say one thing more. It is not well to talk too lightly about postponing the Peace Conference and maintaining firm controls for a long period after the Armistice is signed. Controls, no doubt, will have to be maintained; some of them, in one form or another, may become permanent. But the one thing a Europe enslaved for five years will want beyond all others is freedom; if a liberated State is to be controlled at all it must be by its own government, not by alien Great Powers, whose tutelage, while no doubt more acceptable than Hitler's, may not be so much more acceptable as they think. A spirit of nationality, even of nationalism, will be renascent and vigorous, and full allowance must be made for it. Economists may think economics are the determining factor in reconstruction; it is not so; emotion is often a stronger motive-force than interest. Federal Unionists and other theorists may hold that nationalism ought not to exist, and thereupon proceed on the assumption that it does not. But it does, and nothing could be unwiser than to ignore it. Everyone, moreover, who was at Paris in 1919 remembers vividly how intense and universal was the demand for settlement, for certainty. Peoples insisted on their frontiers being fixed and their governments got going. In the end the Conference had to be rushed to a finish because the uncertainties were driving Europe into what was called Bolshevism while frontier-lines were being argued about on maps spread

on President Wilson's study floor. Let us give full weight by all means to the case for postponing the Peace Conference—provided we are no less conscious of the disadvantages and dangers that may entail.

The peacemakers, whoever they are, wherever they may meet, will have always one dominating problem before their eyes, and yet know that its solution is beyond their power. That is, how to ensure that their successors fifteen or twenty or twenty-five years later will be as resolute as they are themselves to hold Germany's military power in check. If that determination slackens, another war is certain. Its maintenance is fully consistent with the promotion of Germany's economic prosperity. The only hope of peace, indeed, lies in the ungrudging incorporation of a peaceably-minded Germany in the general family of nations. But Germany will never be peaceably-minded so long as her militarists are given an inch of rope.

CHAPTER I

FROM WAR TO PEACE

SOME day, perhaps as suddenly as in 1918, the war in Europe will end. The war in the Pacific is likely to last longer, and though the desire of some Australian and New Zealand statesmen that peace shall not be made till it can be made as a whole is intelligible, Europe clearly cannot be kept at a standstill while Japan is being finally disposed of. The need for immediate decisions will be urgent. The defeat of Germany will mean the end of the so-called New Order which the Nazis have imposed on two-thirds of Europe. Ruthless and tyrannous as it is, chaos and anarchy might be even worse. Yet chaos and anarchy must inevitably succeed unless steps, well considered in advance, are taken without a moment's delay to avert that. Whether they are taken under an armistice—as they must be in the first instance—or as part of the terms of a peace treaty, or of agreements annexed to a peace treaty, matters little. The necessity is to realise that when a man is released from a pillory, if he has been there long enough he will have to be held up.

The first concern is the Armistice, for it is in that that the war must end when it does end. An armistice is a military, not a political, agreement, and the first of the lessons to be learned from the mistakes of last time is that it must be signed by German Generals, not by German politicians. The fact that the Armistice docu-

ment of 1918 bore the names of Erzberger and the nonentities who attended him, not Hindenburg's and Ludendorff's, enabled the Nazis in later years to secure wide credence for the baseless legend that the German army had never been defeated, but simply betrayed by civilian politicians. That must not happen in 1947. The German signatories this time must be the highest officers holding command on the different fronts when the final collapse comes. That will be the first formal step in the transition from war to peace.

As to the terms of the Armistice, it is not enough to say that there must be unconditional surrender. There must, however that may in practice be interpreted. But surrender is a matter not of words but of acts, acts dictated by the victorious Powers, with insistence on precise performance, without the deviation of a hair's breadth, by the vanquished. There has already been one armistice in this war to serve as model, that with Italy, and there will probably enough be more before Germany surrenders. The Armistice which the Germans signed in 1918 was an elaborate document, consisting of thirty-six clauses and two annexes. The Armistice at the end of this war may well be longer. Its purpose will be to render Germany incapable of further mischief, its detailed provisions depending on the positions of the opposing armies when the surrender comes. Last time no German territory was in hostile occupation. This time it may be, though it is possible that the enemy will again decide to lay down his arms before his country is actually invaded. If he does, it may be assumed that the Armistice will provide

for the immediate occupation of Germany by the Allied armies. That will be indispensable for the maintenance of order. In any case an Allied march through whatever remains of Berlin, in particular through the Brandenburger Tor if that still stands, will be a psychological necessity. Nothing will seem more intolerable to the Germans than the spectacle of Russian troops in occupation of their capital and other cities; it is important that they should be made to tolerate it—and reminded who it was that, with a folly equal to its treachery, attacked Russia deliberately in 1941. The small Allied nations must be in visible occupation of parts of Germany too.

The Armistice must have the effect of disarming Germany indisputably. That means that it must provide in the first instance for the surrender of every kind of heavy gun, every warship and every aeroplane. Specific quantities of each type were exacted last time; this time there will be something more. Every German radio station, whatever its ultimate fate, will have to be taken over immediately by the Allies. The radio system will be needed for giving directions to the German people. Even if it were not, its surrender would be necessary as safeguard against its possible use for anti-Allied propaganda, either open or disguised. The risk of that happening may be small; small or great, it cannot be incurred. There will also no doubt be some temporary control of the Press.

Germany, of course, will be called on to evacuate forthwith the countries she has occupied, if she is still in occupation of any when the war ends. The

repatriation of Allied prisoners of war will no doubt begin as soon as the transport system, of which the Allies will take immediate control, permits. The immense task of restoring to their homes the millions of foreign workers whom Germany has impressed for her factories and fields must be secondary to that, and may have to stand over for some time.

An armistice may be of any duration. Whatever the period for which it was originally concluded, it is renewable indefinitely at the option of the victor, the defeated Power, assuming it to have been effectively disarmed, having no choice but to comply. The Armistice of 11 November 1918 was concluded in the first instance for thirty-six days. It actually lasted, as the result of successive renewals, for 229 days, till the Treaty of Versailles was signed on 28 June 1919. The Armistice which Germany concluded with Vichy France on 22 June 1940 remains in force in June 1944. It has, as I have said, been suggested in some quarters that after the surrender of Germany at the end of this war there should be no formal Treaty of Peace, but that the terms agreed on by the United Nations should be imposed on Germany under powers taken at the Armistice. There are some objections to this course, and it seems unlikely to be followed; but even if it were there would clearly have to be a conference of the Allied nations to formulate the conditions to be imposed. The task of the Peace Conference of 1919 was not to secure agreement with Germany—who obviously had to agree to anything—but agreement between the Allies themselves. It will necessarily be

so this time, for however the three major Powers may dominate the situation in Europe it would cause bitter resentment, and prejudice the whole future settlement, if the lesser States had not full freedom to express their views.

The nations at war with Germany are now thirty-five in number, though several of them have not been active belligerents. The places to be assigned at the Conference table to the four Great Powers, Great Britain, the United States, Russia and China (if China figures at a gathering concerned with the affairs of Europe only), France and the smaller States may raise questions of some delicacy—as similar problems did at Paris in 1919. There the Powers were graded, some having five seats, some three and some one. Actually little more was involved than a question of prestige, for the conference only met in plenary session six times in five months, the real work being done by councils and committees, and in any case each State, whatever the number of its representatives, had only one vote. Even that was largely theoretical, for every decision reached was adopted without a division.

A problem of some importance to Great Britain is whether the British Commonwealth should present itself at the conference as a single unit, or each of its constituent members sit as an independent State. It has been argued in this and other connections that the Commonwealth would be more commensurate with the United States and Russia in strength and prestige than Great Britain alone could be. That may be so, but it is difficult to conceive that Canada, after her immense

contribution to the war effort, or Australia and New Zealand, in view of the part their troops played in North Africa and Italy, would be content with a position of less prominence and independence than Norway or Belgium will enjoy. At the Paris Conference each Dominion (and, be it noted, India) had independent representation. Any departure from that principle, which prevailed equally at League of Nations meetings, would be regarded as retrogression.

There is one country, France, whose position it may be difficult to define in advance. Everything will depend on what France's evolution may prove to be between now and the day the conference opens. She will, no doubt, claim to be accepted as a Great Power, on a level with Britain and America and Russia—which means being associated with them in the inner councils of the conference—and she may have earned that place incontestably. Her soldiers began to make her title good in North Africa and reinforced the claim in Italy. Her underground movement may have fortified it further still by the effectiveness of its cooperation with the invading Allies. If much of France has been liberated by the time an Armistice is sued for, and a united and recognised French Government is in being in the regions freed, no one will seek to relegate France to second rank. But an administration that represented no more than a faction would knock at the doors of the inner council in vain. In such an event France's interests would still be in safe hands, but they would not be her own hands.

That Germany will be admitted as a negotiating

party is most unlikely. The purpose of the conference will be to decide the terms to be imposed on her. It will, in short, be a dictated peace, and could not be otherwise. To give German delegates—and however well-intentioned, they could not fail to yield to the temptation—an opportunity to play off some of the Allied nations against others, and exploit their natural ambitions and differences of interest, would be manifestly fatal. In 1919 the treaty was drafted by the Allied States in Paris and then laid before the Germans, who were summoned to Versailles for the purpose. They were invited to submit written observations within a fixed period, and did so to some purpose, for the Treaty was amended in various respects in the light of these. The Germany of this war has much less claim to consideration than the Germany of that, and the probability that more will be shown her is not to be seriously contemplated.

One subsidiary but by no means unimportant question is where the Peace Conference will be held. That matters more than might be supposed. Mr Harold Nicolson has rightly insisted (in his new introduction to *Peacemaking*, 1919) that the conference must not be held in a war area. That is incontestably sound; no one who went through the 1919 conference will forget the disastrous psychological atmosphere in which the proceedings there were conducted, with France, which was the host of the conference, perpetually apprehensive lest any delegate from any country should forget for a moment what France had suffered. Other cities had been suggested for that conference, on

political and even romantic grounds, and various cities have been suggested for this. In making a choice one prosaic fact needs to be borne in mind; the conference must be held in some centre where a large number of delegates and attendant officials can be adequately lodged and fed, and there must be reasonably convenient buildings available for the plenary sessions of the conference and the meetings of its numerous committees large and small. There are not many places on the continent of Europe—it can hardly be supposed that the settlement with Germany will be made outside Europe—that fulfil those conditions today.

Certain other considerations also arise. Accessibility counts for something, though not for a great deal in these days of air travel. Questions of prestige may to some extent be involved. Russia, in view of the part she has played in winning the war, might not look too kindly on a proposal to hold the conference so far to the west of Europe as, say, London or Brussels. Geographically Vienna should be generally acceptable, but what state Vienna and its hotels will be in by the time the war is over is problematic. Both the attractions of and the doubts about Prague are similar. From the purely practical point of view Geneva offers advantages that no other centre can provide. It is in a neutral country which has throughout the war been overwhelmingly pro-Ally in sympathy. It possesses in the so-called Palais des Nations, completed in 1937, and the International Labour Office, completed in 1926, the finest conference buildings in the world.

Both Russia and the United States were accustomed to send delegates there for years (the United States only to the non-political organisations of the League). There may be prejudice in some quarters against Geneva. If so, it is ill-founded, for to make use of the empty League buildings for a few weeks or months as a matter of practical convenience would involve neither a benediction on the League's past nor any commitment about its future. Practical convenience often has to yield to sentiment, but it should not to narrowmindedness.

Another consideration should occupy at least a moment's attention. The task of peacemaking had to be undertaken last time by tired men, and the treaty was the worse for it. They were tired, physically and mentally, before the conference began; they were more tired before it ended. It cannot be different this time. That the war should be waged by one set of national leaders and the peace made by another is not practicable. The United States may have a different President; neither Great Britain nor Russia is likely to have a different Prime Minister. And if Mr Cordell Hull is not at the Peace Conference, Mr Eden and M. Molotov certainly will be. The soundness of the settlement may depend in a very real sense on the principal delegates getting some rest before the conference opens. The demands of public affairs in their own countries may all too easily make that difficult. But on this ground alone—there may be many others—there should be a reasonable interval between the Armistice and the opening of the conference.

CHAPTER II

THE GENERAL TASK

BRITISH diplomacy has had considerable experience of peacemaking after European wars in the last two centuries or so—at Utrecht in 1713 after Marlborough's wars; at Paris in 1763 after Chatham's war (though Pitt was not yet Chatham); at Vienna in 1814 after Napoleon's wars; at Paris again in 1856 after the Crimean War; and at Paris yet once more in 1919 after the Kaiser's war. From each of the conferences concerned something may be learned, but for many reasons the only one relevant to present issues is the conference which sat at Paris (not, as so often wrongly stated, at Versailles) from January to June 1919. The differences, no doubt, are as great as the resemblances. The principal Allied Powers of today, Britain, America and Russia, were the principal enemies of Germany in the last war, but Russia, by the time the Peace Conference opened, had been so completely reduced to impotence by the effects of her own revolution and the German attack, and so riven by civil war between opposing factions, that no Russian delegation had a place at the conference at all. The presence this time of a powerful and victorious Soviet Union will make the outlook fundamentally different from that of 1919, and immeasurably more hopeful. There are other differences; Italy and Rumania were

then among the Allied Powers, today they are defeated enemies. The same is true of Japan, but Japan need only be considered when the war in Asia ends.

The problems to be faced will be both like and unlike those of last time. Some will be easier to solve, some harder. It is a considerable advantage to have the experience of the last conference—a conference recent enough for many participants in it to be still alive and active—on record, as demonstration both of mistakes to be avoided and of successes to emulate. The area of Europe involved in war has been much the same, for though Norway and Holland then remained neutral throughout, Turkey, which is partly European, was a belligerent for four years. The disagreements between the Allies, it may be hoped, will this time be fewer. Questions of frontiers should be easier, questions of relief and rehabilitation more difficult, for this war has been longer than the last, and oppression and deportations have been far more brutal and more widespread. The Allies will go to the conference in a sterner temper this time than then, for they have had their second experience of German aggression and German atrocities in twenty-five years. France in 1914 knew already what German aggression was; Georges Clemenceau, her Prime Minister in 1919, had been Mayor of Montmartre when Paris was under German fire in 1870. We take more seriously today what the French used to say about two German invasions in a lifetime. There could be no illusions anywhere about Germany today, even if the Germany of today were the Germany of the Emperor William. But it is not. It is a country

plunged, after eleven years of Nazi rule, into depths of perfidy and criminality which the Kaiser and his Ministers and Generals never sounded. The Allies of 1944, pledged to enter into no discussion with any Hitlerite Government, and to grant no terms but unconditional surrender, will enter the conference with their attitude towards Germany clear-cut.

But that is not the whole story. Germany is not required to put herself unreservedly at the Allies' disposal, lacking any assurance, much more any guarantee, as to the treatment she will receive at their hands. History here to some extent repeats itself. In the fourth year of the last war a declaration on the principles of peace was framed by the President of the United States. It came to be known as the Fourteen Points, and it was approved, unofficially but generally, by the rest of the Allies. Almost simultaneously the British Prime Minister, Mr Lloyd George, had made a substantially similar statement in London. When in 1918 the Germans sued for peace they stipulated that it should be a peace based on the Fourteen Points and the principles laid down in President Wilson's subsequent addresses. An assurance to that effect was given, and on the strength of it the Armistice was concluded.

Things will not happen quite that way this time. Germany's surrender must be in form unconditional. But she will know, as indeed she is in a position to know already, what are the principles that will guide the Allies in the peace settlement as a whole and in their treatment of her in particular. Those

principles are set out in the document known as the Atlantic Charter, which was drawn up not, like the Fourteen Points, by the head of one belligerent State, but by two heads of States in concert, one of them belligerent and one at that time neutral, for Mr Churchill and President Roosevelt issued their declaration five months before Pearl Harbour. The Charter, moreover, which was published on 14 August 1941, was endorsed on the 24th of the following month by all the Allied Governments domiciled in London, and by the Free French Committee. It must be accepted therefore as the determining factor in the Peace Conference discussions. The Germans cannot stipulate that peace shall be made on the basis of the Atlantic Charter, for they will be allowed to stipulate nothing. But it will in fact be the basis unless the Allied Powers repudiate their own declaration.

The Charter contains eight clauses, in which its authors declare that:

First: Their countries seek no aggrandisement, territorial or other.

Second: They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.

Third: They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them.

Fourth: They will endeavour, with due respect for their existing obligations, to further the enjoyment by all States, great or small, victor or vanquished, of access on equal terms to the trade and to the raw

materials of the world which are needed for their economic prosperity.

Fifth: They desire to bring about the fullest collaboration between all nations in the economic field, with the object of securing for all improved labour standards, economic adjustment and social security.

Sixth: After the final destruction of the Nazi tyranny, they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and which will afford assurance that all men in all lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want.

Seventh: Such a peace should enable all men to traverse the high seas and oceans without hindrance.

Eighth: They believe all of the nations of the world, for realistic as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the use of force. Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea or air armaments continue to be employed by nations which threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside their frontiers, they believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security, that the disarmament of such nations is essential. They will likewise aid and encourage all other practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples the crushing burden of armament.

In view of the importance attaching to the interpretation Russia may put on certain provisions of the Charter, it may be well to quote the salient passages of the declaration made by the Soviet representative, M. Ivan Maisky, at the Allied Governments' conference of 24 September 1941:

'The Soviet Government proclaim their agreement with the fundamental principles of the declaration of Mr Roosevelt, President of the United States, and

Mr Churchill, Prime Minister of Great Britain—principles which are so important in the present international circumstances. Considering that the practical application of these principles will necessarily adapt itself to the circumstances, needs and historic peculiarities of particular countries, the Soviet Government can state that a consistent application of these principles will secure the most energetic support of the Government and peoples of the Soviet Union.’

In an earlier passage M. Maisky had declared that ‘the Soviet Union was and is guided in its foreign policy by the principle of self-determination of nations’, and that ‘the Soviet Union defends the right of every nation to the independence and territorial integrity of its country, and its right to establish such a social order and to choose such a form of government as it deems opportune and necessary for the better promotion of its economic and cultural prosperity’. The discerning eye might possibly descry in the phrase about the principles of the Charter necessarily adapting themselves to the circumstances, needs and historic peculiarities of different countries what may be termed the raw material of loopholes; it is worth noting, moreover, that these declarations were made at a time when the German armies were driving, apparently irresistibly, on Moscow.

But the interpretation of the Atlantic Charter is not as simple as it seems. Some of the British Prime Minister’s glosses on it, indeed, have created a situation which no one could regard as satisfactory. It may be perfectly true, and is, that Germany cannot cite the

Charter as conferring on her any rights or immunities, but the authors of the Charter laid down certain broad principles of universal application, and either they meant what they said or they did not. If they did not, their future statements cannot but be received with some reserve. If they did, as of course must be assumed, then they have committed themselves to certain declarations of policy of which Germans are as free as anyone else to take note. When, for example, they affirm that they 'respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they will live' they proclaim on the face of it tolerance for some forms at any rate of authoritarian government. But Mr Churchill said explicitly in the House of Commons on 24 May 1944 that Italy would be allowed no government that was not democratic—not, evidently, one resembling in any way that under which our ally Portugal has lived contentedly and prosperously for eight years and more. Such a decision may be perfectly sound in itself, but if that was what was always intended it was unwise to include in the Atlantic Charter an assertion of the right of all peoples to choose the form of government under which they shall live.

That, however, is a secondary point. Considerably more important is Clause 2 of the Charter: 'They desire to see no territorial changes that do not accord with the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned.' That can hardly fail to provoke the question, Do they desire to see the transfer of parts of Germany to Poland if that fails to accord with the freely ex-

pressed wishes of the peoples concerned? The answer plainly is that they do, for the Prime Minister has stated that he and Marshal Stalin agreed that Poland needed compensation in the west for what she was to lose to Russia in the east. That again may or may not be justifiable in itself, but no sophistry will reconcile it with the Atlantic Charter declaration. All that can be said—and this, no doubt, is Mr Churchill's contention—is that the intrinsic desirability of certain concrete territorial changes after the defeat of Germany is greater than the intrinsic importance of scrupulous adherence to the principles laid down in the Atlantic Charter. It may be so; but if there are to be many such departures from those principles the Charter will inevitably be left a little tarnished. That, in view of the hopes built on it everywhere, would be unfortunate.

CHAPTER III

NEW FRONTIERS

ON the face of it the problem of territorial changes, involving the demarcation of new frontiers, should make less demand on the time of the new Peace Conference than it did on the conference of 1919. Then virtually the whole of Europe, from France to the Dardanelles, had to be remapped. The ramshackle empire of Austria-Hungary was broken up, various parts of it going to the making of a new State of Czechoslovakia, a resurrected Poland and a Yugoslavia very different from the old Serbia. The German Empire lost territory east and west; and an independent Finland, three Baltic States and Bessarabia, as well as part of Poland, were cut out of what had been the empire of the Russian Czar. Frontier-drawing was an active industry at Paris.

This frontier problem would be much simpler if a Peace Conference believed in peace—believed, that is to say, in the durability of the peace it was making. There was palpable irony in the fact that at Paris, while one commission was constructing a League of Nations to preserve the world from war, a dozen States were arguing their utmost for strategic frontiers to give them the maximum advantage in a future war. That, no doubt, was inevitable. 'Confidence is a plant of slow growth', said Lord Chatham. It is true that he

added 'in aged bosoms', but the world has in fact grown old in its experience of war, and a League of Nations will have to have given convincing proof of its ability to exorcise war before individual States will rely on it for their security, and consent to disregard the strategic aspects of their frontiers and leave them in the main unmanned. Other general considerations affect the frontier problem, though some of them have become less relevant in the last thirty years as a result of the development of air power. Even so a State still prefers a river or a mountain range for a frontier to a mere line of posts on a flat plain. It may want the frontier drawn so as to include some important railway-line, or more probably far enough from the railway-line to leave trains out of range of artillery fire from frontier forts. Or, still more important, there may be some valuable mineral deposits which each of two adjacent States naturally wants to keep on its own side of the line. And there is the necessity, or desirability, of access to the sea, on which States like Poland and Bulgaria have always laid particular stress. Such ambitions (all of which could be mitigated, given reasonable understandings in such matters as trade and transport) clash fatally with the doctrine that frontiers should be determined on grounds of nationality and language; and even those criteria are gravely defective, for in few regions of Europe is there any clear-cut line at which one nationality or one language ends and another begins.

It is in eastern Europe that the principal frontier problems after this war will arise. If, as it is reasonable

to assume, France recovers her position as a recognised Great Power, she will resume her sovereignty over the same territory in Europe as before the war—including, of course, Alsace and Lorraine. There may, indeed, be a demand, as there was in 1919, for the left bank of the Rhine. The demand was abandoned then in consideration of an Anglo-American guarantee—which was never made good—of French security. But France will be in no condition after this war to cope with a large and recalcitrant enemy population within her borders, and whatever may happen to the territories on the left bank of the Rhine they are not likely to come under the French flag.* French territory occupied by Italy in 1940 will, of course, revert to France.

For the rest the territorial conformation of western Europe promises, with one minor exception, to be as it was in 1939. Neither Norway nor Holland nor Belgium has anything to ask; the status of Luxemburg is unlikely to be changed, and, though there might be some strategic advantage in putting part of Schleswig-Holstein, perhaps as far south as the Kiel Canal, under Denmark, that would involve a transfer of population against its will and cast an unduly heavy responsibility on the Danes themselves. The one probable exception to the no-change rule concerns Heligoland, which Lord Salisbury traded to Germany in 1890. After the last war the island, which commands the western entrance of the Kiel Canal, was demilitarised, but left

* That, indeed, was not insisted on in 1919; all France cared about was that her troops should be on the Rhine.

in German hands. That mistake will hardly be made again. Heligoland may revert to British sovereignty, as before 1890, or it may, if international co-operation develops so far, be made into an international naval base. Even so some national sovereignty would be a convenience. An international base under nominal British sovereignty should work perfectly well. There are, indeed, two other minor questions that may need to be settled. Spitzbergen will, no doubt, revert to Norway. Iceland, which before the war enjoyed, or chafed under, joint sovereignty with Denmark, has now thrown that off and constituted itself a republic. The Allied Powers have cordially recognised the change, but in view of the importance of the island both strategically and in connection with air-transport plans, and its incapacity to provide for its own defence, responsibility for Iceland's security will clearly have to be undertaken by some inter-Allied or international force. Agreement with the islanders, who number some 120,000, on a matter so closely affecting their own security should be easy.

The settlement of eastern Europe raises more complex questions, among them one dominating question which may lay some strain on the unity of the United Nations. Various indications suggest that Russia is disposed to regard Europe east of the German frontier as her sphere of influence, and to claim a determining voice in the settlement of the whole of that region. If the settlement Moscow favours is equitable, no one will grudge Marshal Stalin the satisfaction of proposing it. But if in the opinion of

other countries, notably Great Britain and the United States, it does not merit that description, a situation of some difficulty will arise. Distinct, moreover, from the nature of the settlement Russia desires is the question of the means by which she may intend to achieve it. Her idea appears to be to withdraw from the consideration of any Peace Conference the decision about the frontiers of the various States to the west of her. When she invaded Poland and Rumania in concert with Germany in the autumn of 1939 she incorporated in the Soviet Union all Poland's eastern provinces, the three Baltic States of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, Bessarabia and other parts of Rumania. That annexation, which was, of course, completely wiped out when Germany attacked Russia in 1941, the Russians appear to regard as a *fait accompli*, about which there can be no further discussion. Russia would, no doubt, argue that none of these States except Rumania had had an independent existence of more than twenty years when war broke out in 1939; that they were all the creation of the last war, or rather of the Peace Conference that followed it; and that all of them were carved out of Russian territory at a time when the nascent Soviet Russia was too weak and compassed with enemies to resist, even if she so desired.

It is doubtful whether at the time she did so desire. Down to at least the middle thirties she appeared to be quite content with the Polish frontier fixed by the Treaty of Riga in 1921, and with the independence of the three Baltic States. But as the power of Hitlerite Germany grew the outlook changed. Russia realised that a trial

of strength with Germany was inevitable, and set herself first of all to buy time—hence the pact with Germany in July 1939—and then to ensure that when the blow was struck her western frontier should be as far as possible from her richest territories and main centres of population. Hence the invasion of Poland in August 1939 and the occupation of that country's eastern provinces; the attack on Finland in December 1939; and the engineered revolutions in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, ending in their admission to the Soviet Union in August 1940. Claiming such justification for her actions Russia will certainly resist any attempt to reopen at or before a Peace Conference what she regards as closed questions. Nor, so far, at any rate, as the Baltic States are concerned, is anyone likely to run counter to her. No one knows clearly what the condition of these States is today—what changes, transportations and migrations there have been under the German occupation. Probably enough before the war ends there will be a Russian occupation; if so, the anti-Russian elements will take flight, and Russia may find the greater part of the population that remains genuinely friendly. In that event the three republics (whose pre-war population was, approximately: Estonia, 1,250,000; Latvia, 2,000,000; Lithuania, 3,000,000) will go to Russia without much discussion. That they will go to Russia in any case is hardly to be doubted. It is a question whether there is a place in Europe today for independent units as small as this, particularly when they lie in the vicinity of two such Powers as Germany and Russia. As con-

stituent republics of the Soviet Union they would enjoy a reasonable measure of autonomy.

The cases of Poland and Rumania are another matter. One, in spite of the strain that has developed in the relationship, is a country associated with Russia as one of the United Nations, the other an enemy. But Russian policy appears to take little account of that distinction. Russia has no ostensible designs on the independence of either country—Marshal Stalin has more than once dwelt on the necessity for a strong and independent Poland—but she desires to move both of them farther west. Rumania, to deal first with the simpler case, will certainly lose—in Russia's view has already lost—Bessarabia (which was Russian from 1812 to 1914, and has only been Rumanian since 1920), but is welcome, so far as Russia is concerned, to compensate herself for the loss of territory in the east by recovering from Hungary those parts of Transylvania which Hitler compelled her to surrender in 1940. Since Britain, the United States and France were responsible for transferring Transylvania from Hungary to Rumania after the last war there is no reason why—both countries being equally Axis satellites—they should object to reversing the Hitler award and restoring the arrangement made at the Paris Conference.

Poland promises to be a more complicated problem. On the face of it no difficulties should arise at all. Poland is not merely an Allied State; she is the State Great Britain and France went to war to defend. The British guarantee was first given in March 1939, and

reaffirmed in the following August, just before war broke out, in a formal treaty of alliance, the principal clause of which provided that if one of the contracting parties became the object of aggression the other party would at once give it all possible assistance. In consonance with this undertaking Great Britain, on 3 September 1939, declared war on Germany in consequence of Germany's aggression against Poland two days earlier. The natural implication of the treaty, and of the support given to Poland by Britain and France, was that after the defeat of Germany Poland would be restored to the position, and the territories, she held in August 1939. So, if the decision rested with Great Britain, or with Great Britain and France, or with Great Britain and France and the United States, she undoubtedly would.

But Russia is demanding, and is in a position to exact, something very different. Into the rights and wrongs of the dispute which led her to break off diplomatic relations with the Polish Government in London, and countenance, if not actually inspire, bitter attacks on it in the Moscow Press, it is unnecessary to enter here. All that is relevant is the consequence, if it is a consequence,—Russia's resolve to regard the so-called Curzon Line as the eastern frontier of Poland and to incorporate in the Soviet Union all former Polish territory to the east of it. The Curzon Line, it may be recalled, was defined by the Allied Powers in December 1919 at a time when the whole situation over a wide area in the east of Poland was in flux. It did not profess to

represent a final decision. Its effect was simply to testify that all territory to the west of that line was indefeasibly Polish, leaving it to be settled later how much farther east, if at all, the definitive frontier should run. Actually, after war between the two countries, in the course of which Polish troops got to Kiev and then Russian troops reached the gates of Warsaw, Russia and Poland made peace without intermediary, and Poland's eastern frontier was, by the Treaty of Riga, fixed much farther east than the Curzon Line, which from that moment ceased to have any validity. Between 1921, when that treaty was concluded, and 1939 Russia, as has been stated, several times reaffirmed the Riga line. Moreover, although in 1940 she annexed the eastern provinces of Poland, she signed an agreement with Poland in August 1941, after she was attacked by Hitler, declaring that the Soviet-German treaties of 1939 regarding territorial changes in Poland had lost their validity. At the same time Mr Eden (who was present when the Russo-Polish agreement was signed in London) declared that Great Britain did not recognise any territorial changes that had taken place in Poland since August 1939.

In spite of this the Supreme Soviet in February 1944 approved a proposal of the Council of People's Commissaries whereby each of the sixteen constituent republics of Soviet Russia became fully independent, in defence and foreign relations as in internal affairs. The effect of this as regards Poland was to give a new endorsement to the incorporation of that country's eastern provinces in the Soviet republics of White

Russia and the Ukraine. At the moment this was a purely theoretical annexation, for practically all the territories in question were in German hands, but the position has changed considerably since then, and in any case the resolution of the Supreme Soviet was a clear pointer to the attitude Russia would adopt at the Peace Conference, if indeed she consented to having the question discussed at the Peace Conference at all. It is in that that the gravity of the situation consists. It is perfectly possible that a body of detached and competent delegates at the Peace Conference might decide that Poland's eastern frontier should be where Russia desires it to be, but that a single Power, whether Russia or Britain or the United States or Poland itself, should declare a particular contested problem solved in a particular way to its own advantage, even though the solution run clean counter to the Atlantic Charter, and deny its Allies any *locus standi* in the matter, is plainly inadmissible.

Poland, however, has other frontiers than the eastern, and in none of them does Russia profess any interest. She is quite disposed, indeed, to encourage Poland to compensate herself at Germany's expense for what she is losing in the east. Mr Churchill (joint-author of the Atlantic Charter, which condemned territorial changes against the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned) said in the House of Commons on 22 February 1944 that at the Teheran Conference he and Marshal Stalin had 'agreed on the "need" for Poland to obtain compensation at the expense of Germany both in the north and in the west'.

That raises questions regarding three territories, East Prussia, West Prussia and Upper Silesia, which was divided between Poland and Germany after the last war. Of these East Prussia creates fewest difficulties. Originally colonised by the Teutonic Knights in the thirteenth century, it became a Teutonic outpost in Slav territory, and such it has remained ever since. By the Treaty of Versailles it was detached from the rest of Germany. Danzig, adjoining it on the west, was made a self-governing Free City under the general supervision of the League of Nations, and to the west of that again lay the so-called 'corridor' which gave Poland a narrow access to the sea. Danzig, it can hardly be doubted, will be assigned to Poland by the Peace Conference. In the year or eighteen months before the war broke out it was the centre of virulent and aggressive Nazi chauvinism, and German though it is by tradition and population, there could in the circumstances be no justification for leaving it in German hands.

The Polish Government has wisely been slow in declaring its policy on the acquisition of German territory. It is a subject that calls for serious reflection. Against her desire for an increase of territory and resources Poland must balance the dangers attaching to the absorption of a recalcitrant ex-enemy population, supported and stimulated in its recalcitrance by a still powerful Germany on her western frontier. It has been an ill fate for Poland through the centuries to be a buffer between two such States as Germany and Russia, and that fate attends her still. In such circum-

stances she does well to walk warily and give attention to the counsels of her friends. But on the subject of East Prussia her best friends might well be divided. The arguments for its absorption by Poland are clear. Left as it is, East Prussia would remain a hostile and dangerous enclave in Polish territory, cutting off all access to the sea except for a few miles at the mouth of the Vistula, and a fertile source of disputes on such matters as customs barriers and frontier facilities. The home of junkerdom *par excellence*, East Prussia would be, as it always has been, a singularly provocative and undesirable neighbour. That Germany will claim to retain it is of little consequence. The only question for the Peace Conference is whether its absorption by Poland would be a cause of future war, and the answer to that depends in some degree on the efficacy of the provision made on a world scale, or a European scale, for preserving peace and checking future aggression. To subject the population of East Prussia to Poland would no doubt mean transgressing a leading article of the Atlantic Charter. But there are cases where two principles, each good in itself, conflict, and a choice has to be made between them in the light of all the circumstances.

The case for transferring East Prussia is reasonably strong. Under the arrangement prevailing from 1919 to 1939 Poland did indeed possess access to the sea, but it consisted only of a few miles of coast completely indefensible against German attack, for it could be overrun in a matter of hours by a concerted assault from east and west. If her seaboard is to be secure, it

must include most or all of the coast from the Vistula to the Niemen. This can only be effected by the absorption of East Prussia (of whose population of some 2,250,000 only about 12½ % is Polish), unless indeed Russia moves so far west as to acquire Königsberg, a step which would diminish Poland's territorial gain, but considerably increase her security by giving Russia a motive for resisting any attempted reprisals by Germany. The inclusion of two million Germans in Poland could not be contemplated, but that does not mean that the transference of anything like that number (on lines which Hitler has made so familiar) would be necessary. If a Russian advance sweeps over East Prussia there will inevitably be a mass exodus westwards, and all that would be needed would be to prohibit those who had left the province from returning. The junkers, the owners of the great estates which cover 40 % of East Prussia, would be the first to flee, and their departure would simplify the whole situation substantially, for they have been the supreme exponents of Prussian chauvinism, and in addition it would be a great advantage on social grounds to break up their estates for the benefit of small cultivators. When to the voluntary fugitives there are added the inhabitants of East Prussia who have fallen in battle, the problem of absorption reveals itself as of tractable dimensions. There are arguments of some weight both for and against the award of East Prussia to Poland; but this at least is incontestable, that if Germany is to lose any territory at all East Prussia should be the first to go.

But that will not be Poland's only claim. She will certainly look to acquiring territory at Germany's expense in the west, as compensation for what she loses to Russia in the east. If she is wise, she will moderate her ambitions sternly. East Prussia, if she gets it, should be a substantial solatium. Oppeln, in south-east Germany, will no doubt come under discussion. To acquire that would considerably increase Poland's industrial resources and give her a better balance between agriculture and industry—which will be the more desirable if the mainly agricultural East Prussia becomes part of her realm. To dream of a westward expansion to the Oder would be folly, and there is no ground for supposing that any rational Pole does dream of that. The danger is of swallowing more than there is any hope of digesting. If Poland can obtain East Prussia and perhaps Oppeln and the portion of Upper Silesia awarded to Germany in 1921, and settle the tiresome and protracted dispute with Czechoslovakia about Teschen, she will be left in possession of a country with great possibilities. Her chief grievance would be against Russia for depriving her of Lvov (Lemberg)—unless, indeed, as is not impossible, some eleventh-hour concession is made by Russia concerning that.

By contrast with the uncertainties which surround Poland's future the prospects for two Central European States, Austria and Czechoslovakia, appear relatively stable. The single territorial question decided at the conference of British, American and Russian Foreign Ministers at Moscow in October 1943 con-

cerned Austria, the three Allied Governments agreeing that 'Austria, the first country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression, shall be liberated from German domination' and declaring their desire to see a free and independent Austria re-established. Nothing was said about Austria's frontiers, but her territory will certainly not be smaller than it was in 1938, and may well be greater. One of the worst flaws in the treaties signed in the various environs of Paris in 1919 and 1920 was the transference of the purely Austrian Southern Tyrol to Italian rule in order to give Italy a strategic mountain-frontier. There will be small sympathy for any Italian claim to a strategic frontier after the Italian aggression of 1940, and there is no political reason why justice should not be done, and the Southern Tyrol reunited to the country from which it should never have been severed. The idea of a voluntary union, in either a federated or a unitary State, between Austria and a Bavaria separated completely from the German Reich has superficial attractions, but they are much greater than the probabilities, and the prospect is that post-war Austria will be identical with pre-war Austria, except for the addition to it of the Southern Tyrol; whether it is to secure access to the sea at Trieste is a question which remains to be decided. But for Austria anything like autarky is impossible. To make her independent is not to make her economically *viable*; she can only survive through the closest cooperation with other Danube Valley States, and the major Allied Powers will need at the Peace Conference to exert all reasonable efforts to create that.

Czechoslovakia, like Austria, is likely to regain

substantially her old frontiers. Czechoslovakia, in view of what befell her at Munich and after, has an indefeasible claim on the sympathy and support of the Allies, but there is no likelihood of her putting any unreasonable demands before them. Dr Benes and his Government desire little extension of territory. Their country's treaty of alliance with Soviet Russia, identical in all essentials with the treaty between Great Britain and Russia, means that the Czechs possess an ally whose influence is dominant in the area of which Czechoslovakia forms part. There will be some slight adjustments of frontier, at Germany's expense in the north and possibly at Hungary's in the south, and the controversy with Poland over Teschen must be cleared out of the way. But Czechoslovakia has few claims on other people's territory. She may even deem it wise to let the German-speaking Eger district, on the German side of her western mountain frontier, go back to Germany in return for the compensations already suggested elsewhere. She will, it may be noted, acquire a common frontier with Russia if Russia moves westward to the Curzon Line. The question of some kind of confederation of Eastern European, or Danubian Basin, States must in the last resort be a matter for those States themselves, rather than for the Peace Conference, though if the conference deals with economic problems at all, which is inevitable, it will certainly concern itself with this. The advocates of 'a Tennessee Valley Authority for the Danube Valley' have indicated one promising line of development.

In what Marvell might have called the still-vex'd Balkans difficulties are bound to arise, as they always have done. While it is by no means desirable to divide the continent into recognised spheres of influence, Russia's special interest in south-east Europe is generally acknowledged. Rumania was the first of the Balkan States to feel the impact of the Russian armies, and their entry on to her soil was accompanied by an assurance from M. Molotov that Russia neither desired to annex Rumanian territory—apart from what she had acquired in 1940 and temporarily lost since—nor to change the character of the country's institutions. Rumania therefore will part finally with Bessarabia and the northern Bukovina, and probably with only that. The only Allied States, other than Russia, adjoining her are Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia, and neither of these has talked of making any claim against her. (Poland, it is true, adjoined her in 1939, but if Russia gets the Curzon Line the part of Poland lying on the Rumanian frontier will become Russian.) In some respects Rumania may be better off at the end of the war than she is today. Hitler stripped her ruthlessly in 1941 to provide material for gratifying his other allies. Half of Transylvania, which Rumania had acquired in 1919, was handed back to Hungary, and the Dobrudja, in the south-east, went to Bulgaria. She will no doubt appeal at the Peace Conference for the return of both territories, and may quite possibly secure them. In the matter of merits there is nothing to choose between Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. All are subservient satellites of Germany, and the

Allies have no interest in favouring any one of them at the expense of any other, but *ceteris paribus* there is a better case for restoring the pre-war position so far as Transylvania and the Dobrudja are concerned than for leaving Hungary and Bulgaria as beneficiaries at Rumania's expense. The wishes of the populations concerned must, of course, be a factor in the decision so far as they can be ascertained. But no plebiscite in such regions is satisfactory, and though a plebiscite may be a less fallacious guide than any other, the populations—certainly in Transylvania—are so mixed that whichever way the verdict goes it will involve approximately the same degree of injustice and discontent.

Bulgaria, which under German tutelage has advanced into Macedonia and gained its desired outlet to the sea at the expense of Greece, will of course be stripped of its spoils, and possibly of something more. But Greece is not believed to covet Bulgarian territory, nor, so far as is known, does Yugoslavia, partly because each of them, being on the winning side at the end of the last war, secured what it aspired to then. Bulgaria may, then, be fortunate enough to sustain no territorial curtailment except what is involved in the restoration of the Southern Dobrudja to Rumania.

But both Greece and Yugoslavia have certain ambitions. In discussing their claims it is necessary to assume that by the time the Peace Conference opens each country will have settled its constitutional problems and have attained a sufficient degree of unity to enable it to speak with a single voice. That having been established, they will be in a position to lodge their

respective claims. Yugoslavia will, no doubt, demand, and quite reasonably, that every vestige of Italian authority on the eastern shore of the Adriatic, from Fiume southward—i.e. at Fiume itself; the islands in the Gulf of Quarnaro, at the head of which Fiume lies; and Zara, farther south—shall be eliminated. The Yugoslavs, moreover, are no doubt casting hopeful eyes on the Giulian peninsula and Trieste, though little has been said about that so far. But there might be much greater justice in allotting this territory to Austria, which would thus regain the access to the sea which she possessed till the end of the last war. The peninsula was not Italian till 1919, and Italy has no convincing title to it. If she had she might well be considered to have forfeited it by her conduct in 1940. Trieste is important as an outlet for the trade of several States, and proposals for some form of internationalisation of the port deserve full consideration.

But the most important question to be decided in the Balkans is whether Albania should be restored to sovereignty and independence. This small but virile State was one of the earliest victims of Fascist aggression, for Italy attacked it without a semblance of pretext in April 1939, five months before the German invasion of Poland, and in spite of the gallant resistance maintained by the population for two years, capitulation became inevitable in 1941. Albania's claim to be restored to the position she held before Italy attacked her can, on the basis of abstract justice, hardly be contested. But certain larger considerations have some weight. Albania's existence as a European State

has been brief; she came into being in 1912 after the Balkan wars of that and the preceding year; and it is very questionable whether in the conditions prevailing, and likely to prevail, in Europe there is a place for a sovereign State with a population (just over a million) less than that of Birmingham or Glasgow. Albania has her friends in Great Britain, who will champion her claims ardently. Those claims must indeed evoke general sympathy. But sympathy and political wisdom sometimes consort ill, and the capacity of a State the size of Albania to stand alone in the strenuous conditions of the modern world (in the words of the League Covenant) is highly debatable. The question will, no doubt, be argued with vigour. Greece is anxious to acquire part of the south of Albania, including the port of Valona. What would remain if that claim were conceded could clearly not constitute an independent State. The alternative to independence would be either partition between Greece and Yugoslavia, or union, in some federal relationship, with one or other of those States. The ideal, no doubt, would be full autonomy within a Balkan federation, but of federation in the Balkans there is so far no clear sign.

Whether Greece gets any Albanian territory or not there are other directions in which she has ambitions. Though she has never possessed either Cyprus or the Dodecanese Islands in the Aegean she is disposed to claim both—the former unofficially, the latter both unofficially and officially—on grounds of nationality. How far the claim can be justified, particularly in the

case of Cyprus, is another matter. Cypriotes are not Greeks, though they mainly speak Greek. Any change, moreover, in the status of Cyprus would not be a matter for the Peace Conference, for whatever view be taken of the mode of our provisional acquisition of the island in 1878 there can be no doubt about the validity of a title based on annexation in 1914, when Turkey joined Germany against us. And the importance of Cyprus, both strategically and as a civil air-base, is such that there could be no question of yielding full sovereignty over it to Greece. Transfer subject to fairly extensive reservations regarding the use of airfields might be possible, but complications would almost inevitably ensue. Acceleration of local autonomy seems much more practicable.

With the Dodecanese the case is different, for these twelve islands (there are actually fourteen) have been throughout the war in enemy hands. They are some of the early fruits of Italian brigandage, Italy having appropriated them after the war which, without even a pretence of provocation, she declared against Turkey in 1911. That they will not remain Italian can be taken for granted. Many of them, as such names as Rhodes and Leros recall, had associations with classical Greece, and the population is more akin to that of Greece than of Asia Minor. The only other possible claimant is Turkey, who might with some show of reason ask that what was taken from her by violence in 1911 should be restored now as an act of justice. But Turkey's title to register claims at the Peace Conference will depend on the part she may have played in the war by the time

the war ends. Down to the middle of the fifth year her role was not such as to bespeak her a conspicuously sympathetic hearing. And it is uncertain in any case whether Turkey seriously desires the return of the Dodecanese, even though some of the islands are close to her shores. She has professed herself quite ready to see them in the hands of a friendly Power, a description which covers, and was apparently meant to cover, Greece.

But there are certain frontier questions, which must not be completely forgotten, outside Europe. Germany has lost no colonies in this war, for she had none to lose, but Italy has been stripped, temporarily at any rate, of vast territories in Africa. She possessed there when the war began Libya, Eritrea, Italian Somaliland and the lately conquered Abyssinia. That interesting country's subjection was brief, for, the first State to be rescued from Axis domination, it was restored to freedom and independence in 1941. For the moment its pre-war frontiers stand, but some small adjustments are probable. Though Abyssinia had the use of a railway running to the sea at French Djibuti she badly needed a port of her own, and it is now easy to allot her one, perhaps Assab, in Eritrea. Whether any more of Eritrea than is necessary for this purpose should go to Abyssinia (which already includes quite as much territory as can be administered effectively), and whether any of Italy's former colony should remain Italian, are not questions of supreme importance, but some decision will have to be taken regarding them.

There appears to be no strong reason for depriving

Italy of all her colonies. She has been guilty of gross cruelties in some of them, and at the same time been ready to spend large sums on their development. On the other hand, she did little actual colonising. Out of a population of over 600,000 in Eritrea in 1931 there were 6098 Italians. For Italian Somaliland the figures were 1,021,572 and 1631 respectively. To Libya (acquired by conquest from Turkey in 1911) Italy has always attached much more importance, and in 1938 just over 10 % of the colony's 888,000 inhabitants was Italian. But here strategic questions arise. The Allied Powers may not be prepared to leave any part of the southern shore of the Mediterranean in hostile hands, and though Italy may protest that she is no longer hostile her record damns her decisively. No single Allied Power has any title to Libya—France's hands are more than full with Morocco, Algeria and Tunis—and the disposal of the territory may be one of the problems of the conference. The future of existing European colonies in Africa generally is too large a question to be discussed here, and too large to be dealt with in the first phase of any Peace Conference, when issues whose postponement would mean anarchy must monopolise attention. It is indeed hardly a proper subject for a Peace Conference at all, for, in the first instance at all events, any general agreement regarding colonies must be a matter for those States 'possessing' colonies; if the agreement is to be given wider endorsement, that must be at the hands not of an *ad hoc* body like the Peace Conference but of the permanent international organisation, or League of Nations.

CHAPTER IV

SETTLING WITH GERMANY

WHATEVER form the Peace Conference may take, its supreme task must be the settlement with Germany. In effecting that there are many purposes to be considered and many principles to be observed, but dominating them all, so far as the immediate future is concerned, is the determination that Germany shall be made incapable of repeating such aggression as she committed in 1939 and 1940. About the measures necessary to secure that there can be no faltering or hesitation. Vindictiveness is a poor counsellor, and little is heard, in Great Britain at any rate, of desires for a peace of revenge. But a peace of justice there must be, and if justice is to be done the payment due from Germany will be heavy.

Sentimentalism is as much to be eschewed as vindictiveness. No sponge must be passed prematurely over the slate that Hitler and his Germans have fouled. There will be no exaction of an eye for an eye, but there can be no condonation of the bestialities Germany has perpetrated throughout Europe for four years. The full truth about them will never be known; too many witnesses are beyond the power of testifying. But the nature, if not the volume, of them is familiar. In more sober Polish circles the figure of 3,000,000 Jews and 2,000,000 Poles deliberately slaughtered by Nazis in Poland is given as a 'conservative estimate'. Over and

above that are the mass-murders of hostages* and others, the brutalities of concentration camps, and the transportation of millions of foreign workers to semi-slavery in Germany. There is the looting of food from every occupied European country, that 'whoever goes hungry Germany shall not'; the wholesale plunder of machinery and works of art; the absorption of the industry of half Europe by great German concerns like the Hermann Goering Werke, the I.G. Farbenindustrie and others. The picture of a Germany resolved to dominate Europe at any cost in bloodshed and brutality and starvation must be perpetually before the eyes of the peacemakers, not to stimulate them to projects of revenge, but lest, in face of the penalties which Germany's crimes compel them to impose on her, they give way to an ill-considered leniency at the expense of Germany's victims. The task must be approached in a spirit of stern justice, and the sternness is as essential as the justice—in the immediate post-war period in particular.

Some of the principles that must govern the treatment of Germany have, as already mentioned, been laid down in the Atlantic Charter. She is to be completely disarmed, in the first instance unilaterally, with

* A *Times* telegram from Ankara, dated 14 May 1944, reads: 'A German General sent to inspect the coastal defences of the Peloponnesus was killed recently, with two other officers, while driving on the road from Sparta to Molai. In reprisal the Germans shot on May 1st all male inhabitants residing within rifle range of either side of that road—a total of about 2000 persons—as well as 200 hostages in Athens and 130 in Tripoli. Some German soldiers of the execution squads fainted while carrying out this wholesale murder.'

the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security to follow; she will share with other countries access on equal terms to the trade and raw materials of the world; and she will still, apparently, be free to choose her form of government, though the interpretation of this clause is a little uncertain in view of the subsequent reference to 'the final destruction of Nazi tyranny'. Much depends on how these principles are worked out. Germany's downfall will come in the form of unconditional surrender, and no penalty that may be imposed on her could in itself be regarded as excessive. She has shown no mercy anywhere and she can claim none, though in fact she is in no danger of being treated as she has treated others. Nor can lines of distinction or discrimination be drawn between classes of Germans, still less between individual Germans, on the basis of the degree of their professed sympathy with or hatred of the regime. That is not possible, even if desirable. There is no criterion to apply, except in the case of men and women who have actually suffered at Hitler's hands, in concentration camps or prisons. Germany went to war as a nation, as a nation she subjugated Europe, as a nation she is being defeated, and as a nation she must submit to the judgement of the victors. It is idle to bandy words about 'a dictated peace'. A dictated peace there manifestly and inevitably will be. No other peace after such a war, so initiated, is possible. Even those who deplore imposed peaces most can hardly want the Allied leaders to negotiate with Hitler, if he survives the Armistice, or with any other of the leaders of Nazi

Germany. Nor, in fact, plausible though the idea may at first sight appear, can there be negotiation on equal terms about peace conditions with the potential representatives of some new Germany abjuring all the tenets and methods of Nazism and claiming a place among the democratic States of Europe. Such a place is open to Germany, and it is to be hoped she will take it. But after the experience of the last thirty years any new Germany will have to prove its good faith and the sincerity of its professions irrefragably before rational men can put trust in it. To profess repentance is one thing, to bring forth fruits worthy of repentance another. In this case both are essential, and the fruits must be given ample time to mature.

As to procedure, the Armistice agreement must be signed by someone on behalf of Germany, and among the signatories, as has been said, must be her leading generals. The army must set its signature to surrender. When the actual Peace Conference comes the German delegates, whoever they may be, will no doubt have the opportunity, as they had in 1919, of making representations regarding the terms laid before them, and it is possible enough that as in 1919 the terms may be modified as the result of such representations. But negotiations in the sense of discussions that go on till some decision is reached by agreement are plainly out of the question.

The first purpose of the Allies will be to strip Germany of her military power; that will be a term of the Armistice. The second will be to keep her stripped; that will be a term of the Peace Treaty. The Armistice

terms will no doubt stipulate for the surrender of every gun, every tank, every warship, every aeroplane, that Germany possesses, subject perhaps to the retention of a limited supply of machine-guns and small arms for the maintenance of internal order. In November 1918 Germany was required to surrender 5000 guns, 30,000 machine-guns, 3000 mine-throwers, 2000 aeroplanes, 6 battle-cruisers, the best 10 battle-ships, 8 light cruisers, 50 of the best destroyers, and all her submarines. But everything is on a vastly larger scale today, and the Allies have the experience of the past to learn from. It is doubtful whether surrender of weapons by enumeration is safe; complete disarmament seems the path of wisdom. There will have to be full occupation of German territory, so far as it has not been occupied already by invasion. The Allies consented to negotiate with Germany last time before an Allied soldier had crossed her frontiers. There were good reasons why that war should have ended when and where it did, but at least it should have been stipulated that after the Armistice strong Allied detachments should march to Berlin and through it; the legend of the invincibility of the German army could hardly have survived that spectacle. This time Berlin will have to be occupied, and Dresden and Munich and Stuttgart and what remains of Hamburg and Breslau and Hanover and the great industrial centres of the Ruhr. That will be necessary for three reasons—to ensure that capitulation is complete; for the maintenance of order when the Nazi regime and its machinery have collapsed; and as a final demonstration of victory. For

that purpose it is important that the occupying force should include substantial detachments from all the countries Germany has invaded, occupied and enslaved: France and Belgium and Holland and Norway, Poland and Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and Greece. Only so will Germans be brought to a full realisation of what Hitler and his crimes have done for Germany.

Even under such Armistice terms the disarmament of Germany will not be complete. Rifles and revolvers and machine-guns are easily concealed, and tens of thousands of them no doubt will be. But such weapons are useless against a well-equipped army. With tanks and field-guns and heavy artillery and aeroplanes destroyed or surrendered, Germany will be incapable of waging external war within any period which it is at present relevant to consider. During the first months of occupation the whole transport system of Germany will have to be at the disposal of the Allies, both for supplying their own forces and for feeding the civil population, so far as the German authorities are unable to provide for that themselves. On the face of it the organisation of communications inside Germany will be an almost bafflingly formidable undertaking. Actually the situation may prove less intractable than it looks. There is a deep-rooted tradition of rather mechanical and routine efficiency in all branches of public administration, both national and municipal, in Germany, and while there will have to be a drastic purge in the upper ranges of the public services, which have been extensively Nazified, the

lower officials may be expected to carry on with their normal work even under Allied control, partly because their livelihood depends on it, and partly because they will realise that it is essential for the daily life of the country to be kept going.

But disarmament under an Armistice and disarmament under the Peace Treaty are different things. The former is a military measure, and will be enforced by the armies of occupation, which may be expected to establish a firm hold on the chief strategic centres in the country—as the Allied Powers in 1918 conspicuously failed to do. The Peace Treaty will therefore begin to operate with Germany effectively disarmed. The Treaty itself must include enactments calculated to ensure that no surreptitious rearmament escapes notice. That will involve a carefully considered policy. Certain types of weapon—heavy artillery; tanks, other than light types for dealing with civil disturbance; submarines; all warships above a certain tonnage; all military aeroplanes, perhaps all aeroplanes of any kind—these will either be prohibited altogether, or permitted only in strictly limited numbers. Rigorous inspection, in the first instance inter-Allied, later, under ‘a wider and permanent system of general security’, international, will be necessary to ensure that such restrictions are observed. It is easier, it must be remembered, to enforce total prohibition than to check the numbers of a permitted weapon.

There must be two aims in regard to Germany: to deprive her of the desire and to deprive her of the capacity to commit aggression. The former is intrin-

sically and ultimately the more important, the latter the more immediately urgent. And there is a psychological relation between the two processes which must not be entirely ignored. Few reasonable people desire discrimination against Germany to be perpetuated indefinitely, nor indeed to last a day longer than is necessary for the general security. At the best it will last some time, for it will take more than one year or two years or three for Germany to convince the world that she has finally renounced all intention of aggression. But meanwhile the gulf which separates a disarmed Germany from the armed nations ringing her round (her inevitable outcry against a new encirclement is likely to trouble no one) may be gradually narrowed by the progressive reduction of the armaments of the victorious Allies. On financial grounds alone this will be necessary, and no risk should be involved in it provided the Allies' confidence in one another persists, for they will always have between them an overwhelming military superiority over Germany. If, for example, Germany's remaining armaments, such as they are, be represented by a value X , it is clearly much more than sufficient for France and Britain and Russia each to have armaments equal to three or four X . That leaves the contribution of the smaller European States and the possible contribution of the United States and the British Dominions out of account.

As external confidence in Germany's good faith grows, if it does grow, and the cohesion of the Allied nations consolidates (again, if it does), more scaling

down towards Germany's level—in no circumstances a scaling up by Germany towards other nations' level—will become possible. Ultimately, when the Great Powers feel satisfied that they can count on one another confidently to take action jointly against any aggressor (not Germany only), something like parity in disarmament will be practicable. If this confidence exists, Germany can be assured definitely that her disarmament will be followed by the gradual disarmament of all the world; the psychological effect of that will be good. If, on the other hand, the confidence does not exist, the prospects of preserving world peace are negligible. It will only be a question of which nation is to be the prime author of the next world war.

But that is looking some way ahead. The immediate concern is with the disarmament of Germany and her satellites, temporarily under the Armistice, permanently under the Peace Treaty. That, in terms of long-range policy, is a matter less of actual weapons than of war-potential. Germany must not merely not possess the forbidden weapons, she must not be in a position to manufacture them. That applies not only to the various categories of munitions employed in the present war, but to others as yet unknown which a perverse misapplication of the inventive genius of man may bring into being in future years. For that reason the Allies must retain the right to add at any time to the schedule of prohibited weapons or military equipment.

There are various ways in which an effective check on war-potential can be established. One is to ration

Germany systematically in minerals essential to the manufacture of munitions.* The tenacity with which on her eastern front she held on, against all canons of purely military strategy, to Nikopol and the manganese-producing region round it was an index of her dependence on that particular constituent of high-grade steel. Nickel is another obvious necessity, oil a more obvious one still. Of these and many other essentials Germany has no supplies within her own borders, and it would not be difficult to prevent her from importing them. But to do that would be to cripple her peace-time industry, and reduce parts of it to extinction. A serious problem arises here, and a way will have to be found through it. The task should not be impossible. During this war, with the experience of the last war as basis, rationing systems, both internal and international, have been carried to a high degree of efficiency. Last time even more than this (for the circumstances require it less to-day) it was found perfectly possible to allow neutral countries to import enough of various commodities for their own needs, but not enough to leave them any margin for export to the enemy. It should not be impracticable to apply some such system to Germany in respect of various commodities which, while indispensable for peace-time industry, are at the same time essential constituents of munitions. There would, of course,

* This is fully realised by the British Government. Speaking for the Government in the House of Lords in April 1944, in the course of a debate on control of the manufacture of explosives in Germany, Lord Cherwell accepted the principle of strict control of Germany's chemical industry after the war.

have to be some guarantee that such commodities were in fact used for peaceful purposes. Consignments would be importable under licence, and fresh licences granted only against the surrender of certificates showing how and where the last consignment had been used—much as under the clothes-rationing scheme in Great Britain fresh supplies of goods are only obtainable on the delivery of coupons collected from customers to whom the previous supplies were sold. But this is no more than a possibility worth discussing. The success of such a scheme can certainly not be confidently predicted. If a German Government were genuinely willing to cooperate, the system should be perfectly workable. Whether in the absence of such cooperation it could be made effective by a United Nations Board or Commission established in Germany is questionable. Such an arrangement as this could not be permanent, and the danger is that various circumstances would conspire to bring it to an end just at the time when natural recovery might be making Germany once more a menace to her neighbours.

Another possibility of a different character has been discussed. Only a country with a highly developed heavy industry can make armaments on a dangerous scale. Germany is one of the four countries of Europe in that category, the other three being Britain, France and Russia; to them might perhaps be added Czechoslovakia, on the strength of the Skoda works. To control Germany's heavy industry during the Armistice period and for some time afterwards would be comparatively simple, and it will no doubt be so

controlled. But it is necessary to take long views as well as short, and look forward to a time when discriminatory measures against Germany alone would be undesirable even if practicable. The required security might in such circumstances be attained by fusing the heavy industries of western Germany and France, and possibly of eastern Germany and Poland, or internationalising them on a larger scale, so that, with expert foreigners always on the directorates, and in some cases in responsible managerial positions, no secret construction of forbidden weapons would be possible. Such an expedient would be in line with the general tendency of industrial development, which before the war was moving slowly in the direction of closer understandings between the greater industrial concerns of different countries. Cartels have many dangers, but also some advantages. One suggestion, going further than this, deserves some consideration—that the German heavy industries, which have been virtually nationalised on the decision of Hitler and Goering, should be taken over outright by the Allies under the head of reparations. They would thus yield a steady income to reparation account. Whether vital industries in Germany could be worked by directorates representing Germany's ex-enemies, and for those ex-enemies' financial benefit, is a crucial question, not easily answered. When the Saar mines were handed over to France for fifteen years after the last war it was thought necessary to take political control of the area out of German hands for that period. That precedent could clearly not be followed in this case.

But war is still a matter of men as much as of machines. The machines without a sufficiency of trained men to run them are valueless, and for a multitude of tasks in war the plain, historic infantryman is indispensable. It is clear therefore that the size of Germany's standing army must be rigorously limited, but whether the limitation should follow the lines favoured after the last war is a very open question. Germany then was permitted to maintain an army of 100,000 men, all volunteers and all serving for twelve years; and in order to frustrate any attempt to build up a supply of trained men by encouraging resignation after two or three years, so that the places could be filled by new recruits, it was expressly enacted that not more than 5 % of the total number of effectives might be released for any purpose in any one year. This plan was well-intentioned, but the result was that after a few years' training every private was a potential N.C.O. or commissioned officer, and a very efficient one at that. If, therefore, the German army was ever to be expanded, here were its cadres ready-made, a fact of which Hitler took full advantage when he introduced conscription in contravention of the Treaty of Versailles in 1935. The framers of the treaty might argue reasonably enough that it would matter to no one if Germany did produce 100,000 N.C.O.'s, provided she had no army at all beyond that, and that when they drafted the treaty in Paris they never contemplated the possibility that their successors in office would allow Hitler or any other German leader to introduce conscription with impunity. Once more

the question of enforcement is revealed as paramount. If the treaty after this war is to be resolutely enforced, a decision to allow Germany a limited long-term volunteer army may be perfectly sound. If it is not to be enforced, then it makes singularly little difference what the disarmament provisions of the treaty are.

Whether in any case a long-service army meets the needs of the situation best is arguable. Some army Germany admittedly must have. Every nation must be permitted to man its frontiers, if only with little better than a token force, and in Germany the local police and gendarmerie, whatever form the latter may take, may need to be reinforced in emergencies by the military. There will for some time be political unsettlement, and any but the gravest disturbances should be dealt with by German authorities rather than by the armies of occupation. But an alternative to the long-service army is possible. A militia system, with service of not more than six or nine months, would prevent the creation of any highly trained force and would be sufficient for all internal needs. But since it would produce in a few years a substantial total of partially trained men, it would be imperative that anything in the nature of refresher courses should be prohibited and the prohibition be strictly enforced. That might not be easy. The Treaty of Versailles made detailed and specific provision against the creation of what came to be called 'para-military' formations of any kind, but that did not prevent the growth, even under the Weimar Republic, years before Hitler came to power, of semi-military bodies like the Nationalist *Stahlhelm*

and the Republican *Reichsbanner*, accompanied, of course, by the Nazi brown-shirts and black-shirts, the *Sturmabteilung* and *Schutzstaffeln* respectively. The conclusion of the whole matter is that the form of disarmament to be imposed on Germany is of minor importance compared with the imperative necessity of taking action the moment infringements are apparent. And substantial infringements always will be apparent. Tolerance of German rearmaments from 1934 onwards was not due to the Allied Powers' defective intelligence but to their lack of will. The facts were broadly known. Mr Churchill, as a private Member, stated them more than once in the House of Commons, perhaps with some exaggeration but with sufficient approximation to the truth. Responsibility for what was allowed to happen is spread wide over all parties and all sections of the community, and recriminations in retrospect serve no good purpose. The temptation is great, particularly to an easy-going nation like our own, to ignore each trifling stage of the inch-by-inch progress towards a cumulative and formidable violation of the treaty. We have let that happen once, and the effect has been to plunge humanity into the greatest tragedy in history. If we let it happen twice, we shall deserve to be obliterated.

One other aspect of the settlement with Germany remains to be considered. Whatever the provisions of the coming treaty may be, there must, it is argued, remain a solid mass of 70 million Germans planted strategically in the centre of Europe. There must, but it is not quite certain how solid the mass need be. Will

the post-war Germany, in short, be as completely unified as Hitler's Germany is, or is any disintegration of what until 1933 was a federation of partially autonomous States or provinces (*Länder*) probable? The idea of any disintegration or division imposed by the victorious Allies may be dismissed, popular though it is in some French and perhaps in some Russian quarters. That kind of pressure would serve only to precipitate unity. Yet some division that would make this great and inevitably powerful State less potentially formidable in the field—in particular, any reduction of the predominance of Prussia, which in 1939 contained 41 millions out of Germany's 69 million inhabitants—would be a factor making for the preservation of peace. There is nothing to be said for the 'Balkanisation' of Germany. The smaller *Länder* are not fitted for independence. But Bavaria or Saxony, or possibly Württemberg, or a Westphalia severed from Prussia, well might be. Bavaria, as has already been suggested, might conceivably unite with Austria, though the prospects of that are not strong; membership of a Danubian confederation would be a better lot for Austria.

How, in any case, can a centrifugal movement be given a fair chance so far as it may exist, or even initiated from without? One method has been suggested for which there is on the face of it something to be said. It is clear that daily life in Germany after the war will be directly affected for months or years by Allied actions and decisions. In a variety of spheres Allied Commissions will be working in close associa-

tion with German authorities. But it is by no means necessary that these authorities should take the form of central organisations at Berlin. The Allies could declare from the first that they intended always so far as practicable to deal direct with the *Länder*, and that the latter must forthwith re-create for the purpose the provincial administrations which Hitler destroyed. The incentive would be powerful, for much of the Allied activity, such as the work of U.N.R.R.A. or other food-distribution agencies, would be for the direct benefit of the individual German citizen, and when once it became clear that the benefit was obtainable only through his provincial capital, Munich, Dresden and the rest, not through Berlin (except in the case of Prussia), his State, or province, would assume a new or restored importance in his eyes. As a consequence (it is argued) a revived State-consciousness might emerge, developing in some cases into a desire for actual independence. If not, then as the Allies reduced their active intervention in German affairs the States would be free to re-create a federal government at the centre as it existed before, and for the first thirteen years after, the last war, or, if they preferred, revert to the purely unitary government which Hitler established.

To this proposal, which undeniably has certain attractions, there are obvious objections. Its adoption would to some extent increase the administrative difficulties of the Allies; that, however, might be worth risking for the sake of the result. Much more important is the fact that the general tendency is, and

should be, to increase, not diminish, the size of economic units in Europe, and that such services as transport, must, for the sake of efficiency, be centralised. But to that again there is a rejoinder. If the aim be, as it admittedly is, to prevent political frontiers everywhere from becoming economic frontiers, and to disregard them so far as possible in such matters as road, rail and air transport, electric-power transmission and the flow of trade generally, then some multiplication of political frontiers is of little moment. So far as Germany is concerned all that can safely be said is that, while disintegration must not in any way be forced from outside, any spontaneous movement on the part of any of the *Länder* might be very properly encouraged—though not to the extent of relieving the seceding State from its share of any burdens laid on Germany by the Peace Treaty; that would be too easy an escape.

Mention has been made of the task of feeding Germany, through U.N.R.R.A. or some other agency. (Actually the feeding of the population of an enemy or enemy-occupied country rests in the first instance with the army, and is carried out by the department known as Civil Affairs, or G 5; as soon as a zone is clear of military operations, owing to the advance of the armies, U.N.R.R.A. takes over the responsibility.) This raises difficult questions. Even if there are sufficient stocks in the country to provide a reasonable ration for some weeks or months, it may well be argued that some part of them should be taken back to the countries from which they were looted. The principle

that all children, Allied and ex-enemy alike, should share equally, and should have a prior claim on what provisions are available, will probably command assent, but in regard to adults the case is not so simple. Germany during the war has followed a very simple rule regarding foodstocks in Europe. Goering enunciated it in 1942: 'If there must be hunger, it must in no circumstances be in Germany.' Neither Germany nor her apologists elsewhere could complain if that principle were now applied in reverse. The country, of course, cannot be left to starve. Somehow or other—and it is likely to prove a formidable undertaking—bare subsistence rations must be found for all Europe, Germany included. But as it becomes possible to improve on that, Germany's place must be at the end of the queue. Bread there must be for all, but some day there will be signs of cake as well. That, in bare justice, must go first to the countries that Germany has been looting and starving for years. U.N.R.R.A. will be the chief agent for food distribution in Europe in the immediate post-war period, and its chief concern will be to complete its work by setting nations on their feet and making its own further existence unnecessary. It will hardly feel called on to add to, or protract, its labours by providing Germany with cake.

One baffling question may be raised at the Peace Conference, but whether any reference to it will be found in the Peace Treaty is very doubtful. That is the problem of the re-education of Germany. About its necessity there can be no argument. Every German child born between 1920, when the Treaty of Versailles

came into force, and 1937, has passed part or all of its school life under the Nazi regime and been methodically imbued with Nazi doctrines. The school books, particularly the history books, have been rewritten to reflect the Nazi *Weltanschauung*. It will take ten years, someone once said, to de-Nazify the young Nazis. How is this task to be faced? What is the antidote to the poison? It is easy to say that a new spirit and a new outlook must be introduced into the schools, but very far from easy to find ways of introducing it. Where is a supply of teachers with the right outlook to come from? What ideal is to replace the appeal which the defiant nationalism of the Nazis has undoubtedly made?

Merely to frame these questions is to demonstrate the difficulty of dealing with the reform of the German educational system through enactments in a Peace Treaty. The single satisfactory solution would be a reconstruction of the educational system by a German government genuinely resolved to lead Germany into new ways; if the existence of such a government could be assumed, many problems besides that of education would be solved. What is certain is that the German educational system must remain German. Any attempt to put it even temporarily under external control would inevitably produce the precise opposite of the result desired. It might, no doubt, be possible, and perhaps desirable, to condemn many of the Nazi school books and to appoint a commission, predominantly German, to prepare substitutes, which the Education Minister (or Ministers) should be required

to prescribe. But that would have only limited value, for teaching does not consist merely in putting books in children's hands; if a German teacher still wanted to inculcate Nazism or something similar, it would matter little what text-book the children had before them. The only hope is in a revolt against the whole philosophy of Nazism among the teachers themselves, particularly when they realise the depth of the abyss into which Nazism has driven their country. But that is not to be effected by any formal stipulations in a treaty.

CHAPTER V

REPARATIONS?

THIS chapter will be briefer than any chapter on reparations after the 1914-19 war could be. The history of the embittered controversy on reparations down to their virtual cancellation in 1922 has chilled any enthusiasm for the exaction of heavy payments from the Germany or the Italy that may emerge from this war. Yet the principle of reparation stands. Mr Lloyd George argued eloquently after the Armistice of 1918 that it was an established rule of legal procedure that the loser paid. The argument was weak, in that sentence on Germany was being passed not by an impartial arbiter but by an enemy more powerful than herself who had defeated her in war. If there were to be reparations, that was because she had lost the war, not because she was necessarily in the wrong, though in fact she incontestably was. If there are reparations this time, it will be because the Allies are in a position to exact them, and the justice of their action will be indisputable in proportion as Germany's guilt in committing the original aggression is indisputable.

Whether it is expedient, or even possible, to exact reparation payments is another question, to which careful attention will have to be given on both sides of the Atlantic and at both ends of Europe. The Russians have no idea of forgoing their claim to reparations, as various articles by the well-known

Moscow economist, Professor Varga, have indicated. But the question to be answered, this time as last, is how much Germany will be in a position to pay, and by what means payment is to be extracted from a defeated enemy whose supreme purpose it is to prove her incapacity to pay anything. Since the last war Englishmen, notably Lord Keynes, have written important books demonstrating that Germany could never have paid anything like what was demanded of her, and Germans, notably Herr Schwarzschild, have written other books demonstrating that Germany pursued a policy of evasion with pertinacity and success, and could in fact have paid much more than she did.

That argument is worn threadbare by now, and even if there were agreement where there is in fact acute conflict it would help little, for the Germany of 1944 or 1945 is not the Germany of 1918. Germany started this war a poorer nation than she was when she started the last, it has been a longer and much more costly war and—most important of all—whereas Germany ended that war with her territory uninvaded and her productive power intact (there had been no bombing of German factories) she is to-day a country more comprehensively devastated than Russia—which has unquestionably suffered more than any other European country, even Poland. But when all allowance is made for that, it does not justify the conclusion that Germany will be incapable of paying any reparations at all. To discuss her capacity to pay is idle at this stage, for the necessary data are at present hopelessly incom-

plete. That must be a matter for skilled ascertainment after the war is over, and obviously the answer to the question what Germany can pay will depend on how long the war has lasted, and what by the end of it the destruction of her instruments of production amounts to. All that need be emphasised here is that the question is not to be prejudged in her favour in advance.

That caution is necessary, for a tendency to pre-judgement undeniably exists. Ever since 1919 British thought on the subject of reparations has been influenced, not to say dominated, by Lord Keynes's brilliant book *The Economic Consequences of the Peace*, which appeared less than six months after the Treaty of Versailles was signed and sold five editions in its first year. Even apart from its author's authority and ability, there were reasons for the vogue the volume achieved. It was the first book of importance to appear on the Peace Conference; it was eminently readable, even by laymen unfamiliar with economics, and it chimed well with the general British irritation at what was regarded as France's implacable attitude towards a beaten foe. But Mr Keynes (as he then was) was writing not of what the economic consequences of the peace *were*, but of what in his estimation they would be; he was writing at a time when he was still, like the rest of us, under the emotions of the Peace Conference, and when the Reparation Commission, whose business it was to assess the bill for damages against Germany and then decide how much of that total she was in a position to pay, had not come into formal existence at all.

His book, indeed, did something to create the situation it predicted, for when a leading British economist, carrying a large section of British left and left-centre opinion with him, asserted that Germany was incapable of paying more than a limited sum in reparations it obviously became the main purpose of German policy to prove him right. There is no doubt that in the main he was right, but no one can say how right. Leopold Schwarzschild's book, *World in Trance*, is open to some criticism, but Schwarzschild wrote with a detailed internal knowledge of Germany, and his reasoned argument going to show that Germany resolved from the first that she would pay as little in reparation as possible, and largely carried out her resolve, cannot be completely dismissed. 'Dr Schacht', writes Herr Schwarzschild, of the period 1925-30, 'was annoyed by the indisputable fact that the great stream of capital pouring into Germany made it impossible to claim that she could not pay any reparations. His goal was to keep great streams of money pouring into Germany, yet not enough to leave a surplus for the payments. He made a few unsuccessful attempts to restrict foreign investments to just the right amount for his purposes. Even so, a day would come when it could be truthfully stated that Germany had never paid a cent of the reparations; when it would be clear that even the five instalments she had made were actually paid by other countries. The end of the reparations farce was that Germany received three times as much from abroad as she ever paid.' This clearly must be taken for no more than it is worth, but

its worth is not negligible. All I desire to emphasise here is that the fact that Germany did not pay is not proof that Germany could not pay, still less proof that Germany will not be able to pay something, at any rate, now.

Another reason for discounting German protestations about the impossible burdens of reparations is that, as Dr J. T. Shotwell demonstrates convincingly in his *What Germany Forgot*, they were prompted largely by the necessity of diverting the attention of the German public from the financial situation resulting from the cost of the lost war. That amounted to about four times what Germany paid in reparations, but official propaganda set itself with marked success to inculcate the belief, not in Germany alone, that what was ruining Germany was not Germany's war expenditure, but the Allies' post-war demands. What Germany actually did pay from first to last in reparations is matter of dispute, for it depends largely on the valuation to be put on various surrenders of material and deliveries in kind. The Germans naturally put an impossibly high figure on these; the Reparation Commission may possibly have rated them too low. The estimate of the Brookings Institution at Washington, arrived at in 1932 after all payment had ended, was a little over £1,000,000,000, and that is probably as near as it is possible to get. Some indication of what it might theoretically be possible to extract from Germany may perhaps be derived from a consideration of what Germany has succeeded in extracting from the countries she has occupied. In the House of Commons

on 10 May 1944 the Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Economic Warfare said that his Department estimated that, taking the mark at 13½ to the £, the total amount of war indemnities and other financial exactions, including the accumulated clearing balances, had reached a figure of approximately £5,800,000,000 in France, Belgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia.

It must be noted that while Germany was defaulting on reparations she was, as has been said, borrowing heavily from abroad* and beginning to spend heavily on constructing armaments forbidden by the Treaty of Versailles. A British Treasury statement showed that national taxation per head in 1923-4 was: Great Britain, £15.18s. od.; France, £6. 18s. 2d.; Germany, £4. 1s. 4d. These figures may not be strictly comparable, for the relation of State and local taxation in the three countries no doubt differed, but they are at least suggestive. It is to be noted that even Mr Keynes, in *Economic Consequences of the Peace*, believed Germany capable of paying £2,000,000,000, which is probably twice as much as she actually did pay. From all this no very clear positive conclusion emerges, but one negative one does. There is no warrant for dismissing the idea of securing from Germany any reparation at all

* Sir Arthur Salter, the first secretary of the Reparation Commission, wrote in 1932 in his book *Recovery*: 'in the four years 1925-8, which followed the Dawes Plan, the net import into Germany amounted to no less than 15,000,000,000 gold marks (£750,000,000), about half as much again as all the foreign exchange Germany has devoted to paying reparation up to the Moratorium of 1931.'

as a contribution to the restoration of the countries she has devastated. Certainly the principle of her liability to pay should be established.

Even if reparations were abandoned largely or wholly, that would by no means involve abandoning either the principle or the reality of restitution. Germany has pillaged Europe for five years on an unexampled scale, and both abstract justice and justice to her victims demand that in no circumstances shall she be permitted to profit by her brigandage. In 1919, it may be recalled, many Englishmen declared themselves shocked by the provision of the Treaty of Versailles which required Germany to deliver 140,000 milch cows to France and Belgium, protesting that the transfer would mean the death of thousands of German children. It would be interesting to know whether the same people feel the same indignation as they look back to-day. The cows were to replace stock destroyed, much of it deliberately, in France and Belgium through the German invasion of those countries. If the cows were handed over, German children would waste and die for lack of milk; if they were not, French and Belgian children would waste and die. What, in such a case, did equity demand? On all such matters the Germans, of course, made assiduous propaganda. The German Peace Delegation at Versailles in 1919 protested that 'those who sign this Treaty will sign the death sentence of many millions of German men, women and children', on which Mr Keynes commented, 'I know of no adequate answer to these words'. The answer seems to have been supplied since

by the vital statistics of the immediately subsequent years. Between 1920 and 1925 the population of Germany had increased by a million and a half, the rate of increment representing almost precisely the same percentage as in Great Britain.

The case for restitution is much stronger this time than last, in proportion as Germany's aggression has been more brutal and her conduct of the war more barbarous. The destruction of everything destructible, by no means due to the ordinary processes of war alone, has been on such a scale that a desperate shortage of a hundred commodities essential to the life of nations—food, machinery, clothing, transport vehicles, farm implements—has been created. Who, in such a case, is to go short? The question admits of no two answers. Certainly the Peace Conference will not consider more than one. So far as Germany can make good the deficit—and at best she will only be able to make good a part of it—Germany must. But to accept that principle is easier than to apply it. In some cases, no doubt, the procedure will be simple. Germany has carried off to Berlin or some other centre the gold reserves of the central and other banks in many of the countries she has looted. The amount is known, and the gold is not likely to have left Germany. At any rate Germany must possess in one form or another enough gold to replace all she has carried off. There can be no question about the course to be followed here.

The same line will no doubt be taken about other specific objects. Goering and other Nazi leaders have looted works of art right and left from the museums

and picture galleries of Europe. Where these can be identified they will, of course, be recovered. But some will have disappeared or been badly damaged. Here it would seem only equitable that Germany's own galleries should be drawn on for compensation, for while the principle that she shall not be allowed to profit by her crimes needs no arguing, it must follow equally that her victims shall not lose by them in cases where she is capable of making any approximate atonement. Clearly the question what is reasonable replacement, so far as is practicable of like by like, must be decided by some semi-judicial body. It would be easy to appoint an Allied commission which would on the one hand receive reports of looting from public and private galleries and on the other select from German collections the pieces most appropriate to figure in each case as restitution. German galleries would, of course, as a consequence be seriously impoverished. If there is any temptation to question the justice or equity of that, it need only be asked whether it is right that German crimes should impoverish Germany herself or her unfortunate victims. The Treaty of Versailles was explicit on this point. See, for example, Article 247, whereby 'Germany undertakes to furnish to the University of Louvain . . . manuscripts, incunabula, printed books, maps and objects of collection corresponding in number and value to those destroyed in the burning by Germany of the Library of Louvain. All details regarding such replacement will be determined by the Reparation Commission.'

This principle clearly admits of wider application.

Take, for example, the question of machinery. Everywhere in the countries she has occupied Germany has looted, everywhere in the countries she has fought over she has smashed—sometimes of course in the ordinary vicissitudes of war, but often, most particularly in Russia, for the sake of destroying anything belonging to the enemy. At the end of the last war Germany was left with her factories and mines and workshops intact, while those of her principal enemy, France, had been destroyed methodically; as the German armies retreated they even hacked down or rooted up the fruit trees out of sheer malignity. That was why Germany, with all her means of production ready to resume full activity, was assumed to be capable of paying reparations, and why, to take one example, France was given the output of the Saar mines for fifteen years as compensation for damage deliberately inflicted on her own Pas de Calais pits. The situation is not the same this time. Even in 1918 the Royal Flying Corps was employed almost wholly over the battlefields; it never did any damage worth recording inside the German frontier. Today thousands of German factories and the machinery they housed are in ruins. Reconstruction will be a more formidable problem in Germany after this war than it was in France after the last war. But not, even so, as formidable as it will be in Russia, where in the vast area occupied by Germany after 1941 it was made a point of honour (if the word may be so prostituted) to leave every Russian city an empty shell as the Germans retreated from it. Those cities must be rebuilt

and re-equipped. Who is to bear the cost of that—Germany or Russia? If equity is a factor in the decision, the answer cannot be in doubt; so far as Germany can make restitution Germany must. That cannot be interpreted to mean that every machine in Germany capable of being transported to Russia or some other ravaged country should be. Germany can clearly not be stripped completely of her productive instruments. To do that would create more problems than it would solve. But some contributions she certainly should make. Otherwise the world would be faced with the spectacle of an aggressive but defeated Germany manufacturing and trading profitably while the victims of her aggression and destructive fury were left with masses of twisted metal that were once machines piled inside the gutted walls of what once were factories. Justice cannot be derided to that extent—and Russia at least can be counted on to see that it is not. Here again some authoritative commission will be needed, to decide the volume and nature of the contribution Germany can properly be required to make.

The application of the principle of restitution need not be pursued in detail here. The restitution clauses of the Treaty of Versailles afford some guidance as to what may, and perhaps as to what may not, be practicable and expedient. Under that treaty, for example, Germany, which had destroyed millions of tons of Allied shipping by unlimited submarine warfare, was required to hand over all her merchant-ships of 1600 tons and upwards, and a lesser proportion of her

smaller vessels. That appeared at first to various British critics of the treaty intolerable severity, which would reduce Germany to a disastrous dependence on the shipping of other States. It did not turn out so. Germany delivered the vessels as stipulated and then proceeded with great vigour to build new ones suited to her particular needs; by 1930 her crack liner *Europa* had won the blue ribbon of the Atlantic. She was further required to provide material in specific quantities for the reconstruction of devastated areas in France and Belgium;* to deliver specified quantities of coal, specified numbers of stallions, mares, bulls, milch cows and other stock, and such quantities of dyestuffs and chemical drugs as the Reparation Commission might from time to time direct. She had, moreover, to bear the costs of the Armies of Occupation. That provision will no doubt figure in the coming treaty, and it will be a more formidable item this time, for the first few years at any rate, since a far more extensive occupation than took place after the Armistice of 1918 may be regarded as certain; on the other

* Germany proposed to send labour to France to carry out the reconstruction of devastated areas, but the French declined, being unprepared, after four years of partial occupation, to tolerate Germans on their soil in any capacity. Russia, on the contrary, according to articles that have appeared in the Soviet Press, intends to demand German labour as well as German material for the reconstruction of her shattered cities. It has been argued with some cogency that if Germany could even before the war employ some fifty per cent of her resources on the production of munitions, it would leave her no worse off to employ the same proportion for a period of years on the production of goods to be handed over to the countries she has ravaged.

hand, it may not last as long; that depends on how long it takes for a new international security system to inspire general confidence. Restitution, on any equitable basis, will amount to a formidable figure. It is in the light of the estimated total under that head that the further decision regarding reparations*, as a contribution to the Allies' war costs, must be taken.

* I have used the singular, 'reparation,' and the plural, 'reparations,' indifferently as seemed convenient. The singular is usual in English, the plural in French.

CHAPTER VI

A NEW LEAGUE

THE heading which this chapter bears is not to be taken as prejudging in any way either the form or the name of the future international organisation. That there will be an international organisation is not in doubt; its creation is implied in the Atlantic Charter and specifically proclaimed in the Moscow Conference resolutions of October 1943. Whatever shape the organisation may take, it will certainly differ sufficiently from the existing League of Nations to deserve to be described as a new League.

In discussing the new League we do not start from nothing. Certain principles have been laid down, and may be taken as generally accepted. The Atlantic Charter, by ordaining the disarmament of the aggressor nations 'pending the establishment of a wider and permanent system of general security', assumes the existence of some body to organise the wider system and direct its operation. It is entirely in keeping with that assumption that at Moscow the representatives of Great Britain, the United States, Russia and China should have recorded their recognition of 'the necessity of establishing at the earliest possible moment a general international organisation, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving States, and open to membership of all such States, large or small, for the establishment of international peace and security'.

It is important to gauge the weight of authority

behind the various pronouncements on this subject. The Atlantic Charter declaration, very general in its terms, has been endorsed by about a dozen of the Allied nations. The Moscow declaration, which specified the establishment of international peace and security as the accepted aim, but gave no indication of how the goal was to be reached, was issued in the names of Great Britain, the United States, Soviet Russia and China. A decisive advance was registered by the Conference of Prime Ministers of the British Commonwealth, which in May 1944 demanded that the world organisation should be 'endowed with the necessary power and authority to prevent aggression and violence'. That, of course, engaged only Great Britain and the Dominions. Mr Churchill, speaking in the House of Commons a few days later, could no doubt assume the concurrence of his Dominion colleagues when, in more explicit language, he laid it down that, to prevent the planning or the actual outbreak of future wars, 'there must be a World Controlling Council comprised of the greatest States which emerge victorious from this war, who will be obligated to keep in being a certain minimum standard of armaments for the purpose of preserving peace'—and also a World Assembly of all Powers, standing in a relation still to be defined to the Council. This is practical common sense, but as outlined to the House of Commons the plan represented nothing but a British view. Since then President Roosevelt has outlined a League substantially similar (but without a 'police force'), consisting of a General Assembly; a

Council including the four major Powers and some others elected annually; and an International Court of Justice. The Peace Conference will no doubt consider these plans, and perhaps others, and on the basis of them draft in detail a constitution for the new international organisation.

‘To achieve international peace and security’ is the declared object of the existing League of Nations, and if the new League is to succeed in that high aim it is necessary to realise why the existing League has failed in it. There is no ground for attributing that failure to the structure or constitution of the League, or to the frequently criticised unanimity vote, which in fact rarely came into question. The League certainly lost authority through the absence of the United States, but the root cause of the failure to prevent aggression was the unwillingness of the individual nations, particularly the nations with the greatest power at their disposal, to carry out the undertakings they had given when they signed the Covenant. There were no doubt legal loopholes for evasion, but the plain duty of every member of the League when faced with the fact or menace of aggression was to take common action, economic or military or both, against the aggressor State—and it was essential always to realise that the reaction of such a State against economic sanctions might involve war. The form a new League is to take is no doubt important, but far more important is the question whether its constituent members are prepared to carry out their undertakings under its Covenant to the point of armed action if that

be needed. If they are, the League, even though its constitution be misconceived, will serve its ends. If not, the most faultlessly drafted articles will not save it from failure and disaster.

It would be unwise to assume that the new League will evolve, through various adaptations, from the existing League. It may, but there are other possibilities. The outstanding reality on the world stage at this moment is not the association of States which met year by year at Geneva from 1920 to 1939, but the alliance of thirty-odd United Nations which Hitler's aggression brought into being. Here is an association of nations doing precisely what the League of Nations was meant to do—and it is worth noting that it originated in the action of two League of Nations Powers, Britain and France, in accordance with basic League principles, against an aggressor attacking not them but a third State. This new association is defeating Germany, and when she has capitulated it will continue for an indefinite period to guard the peace and to carry out various humanitarian tasks essential for the preservation of civilian life in Europe and of some other regions of the world. It will effect the disarmament of Germany and the demobilisation of her armed forces, and occupy the country to prevent any attempt at a recrudescence of war. Through various *ad hoc* organisations like U.N.R.R.A., representing the United Nations as a whole, it will undertake short-term relief and rehabilitation, repatriate and settle refugees and arrange the return of millions of deported workers to their homes. This means practical

cooperation on a vast scale in a variety of different fields, and it is clear that the nations uniting in it could form the most valuable nucleus for a larger organisation, with which neutral States could be associated immediately and ex-enemies at such times as might seem fit. It may be some while before the latter can convince the world that they fall into that category of 'peace-loving States' of which the Moscow resolution spoke.

There is another consideration of some importance. It has been argued with much force* that progress should be on the *solvitur ambulando* principle, nations combining to carry out particular tasks as they arise, and the various international executive bodies created for this purpose being ultimately associated and coordinated into a supreme political international organisation. Everything the Allied Nations are at present doing in concert points in this direction, most conspicuously—and this is a fact of great significance—in the military sphere. The complete integration of British and American military, naval and air commands stands by itself, for the same opportunities have not presented themselves to any other two of the Great Powers. But in Italy British and American and Dominion troops, and French and Italian and Polish, have been fighting as integral parts of the same army; in a different element British and American and Czech and Polish and Norwegian and Belgian and Dutch airmen have been working as parts of one great

* E.g. by Dr David Mitrany in his Chatham House booklet, *A Working Peace System*.

machine; and at sea cruisers and destroyers and submarines of half a dozen nations have been incorporated in fleets of which Great Britain and the United States are the mainstay. This cooperation cannot be dispensed with when the war ends. There has been considerable academic discussion in the past about the practicability of maintaining an international force for the preservation of peace. So far as practicability goes that question is now settled. It is by integrated international forces, by land, sea and air, that the war is being won. To scale them down to the level deemed adequate after victory, without sacrifice of their cohesion, would present no insuperable difficulties (it would not be true to say that it would present no difficulties), and the wisdom of such a course hardly needs demonstration. It is not practicable to discuss here such fundamental questions as whether the main responsibility can be left to an international air force (the *sole* responsibility almost certainly could not), and whether such a force, or for that matter international ground forces, should consist of contingents from national forces, as is the case during the war, or of strictly international forces, raised by individual recruitment from all nations. There might well be gradual evolution from the one system to the other.

Another form of international cooperation well deserves perpetuation under the new international authority. A unique feature of this war has been the cession of naval, military and air bases by one country to another, primarily by Great Britain to the United States. (The construction of the Alcan Highway, from

the Western United States to Alaska, by Canada and the United States jointly falls much into the same category.) The experiment has worked well, and its extension after the war has been seriously discussed, the R.A.F., for example, being given forward bases in Belgium and Holland and northern France, and some or all of these countries acquiring bases in Britain—valuable because less immediately exposed to attack than those on the continent of Europe. Such arrangements would be made in the first instance by direct agreement between the countries concerned, but it is clear that they would all fit appropriately into a larger framework. There would in effect be a double framework, international and continental, and the relation between the two parts of it will need careful definition. Many problems, notably that of air transport, transcend continental frontiers, and in many other spheres no decisive geographical line can be drawn between the vital interests of, say, Europe and Asia. It would be a mistake to assume that a European Council is of greater importance to Europeans themselves than a World League, though there is no doubt room, and need, for both. On the whole the number of problems that will have to be dealt with on a world scale will tend to increase; that will lay more burdens on the World League, and add to its significance.

Meanwhile the need for continental councils is beyond argument. The beginning of something of the kind exists already in the Western Hemisphere, in the Pan-American Union, though the bonds between its members have so far been deliberately kept loose.

A European Council is likely to be more immediately important; its character is matter for discussion, but the strange suggestion that Britain and Russia should not be members of it may be dismissed. The most detailed sketch of such a council put forward with any authority emanates from the Prime Minister of Great Britain. In a broadcast address in May 1943 Mr Churchill outlined the European Council on which his mind has been working. The passage of his speech devoted to the subject deserves to be studied textually.

‘One can imagine’, said the Prime Minister, ‘that under a world institution embodying or representing the United Nations, and some day all nations, there should come into being a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia.’ The European Council, he observed, would probably take shape first, because the war against Japan would outlast the war against Germany. Mr Churchill spoke, as he always has spoken, with great respect of the League of Nations. ‘I hope’, he said, ‘we shall not lightly cast aside all the immense work which was accomplished by the creation of the League of Nations’, and he continued: ‘we must try to make the Council of Europe, or whatever it may be called, into a really effective League, with all the strongest forces concerned woven into its texture, with a High Court to adjust disputes, and with armed forces, national or international or both, held ready to enforce these decisions and prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars.’

Regarding the structure of the Council the Prime

Minister assumed that the Great Powers (which would in the first instance be Great Britain, Russia and France, Germany and possibly Italy being added later) would have seats as of right, and that the smaller States would form groups or confederations (not federations) with one representative on the Council for each. As he put it: 'Side by side with the Great Powers there should be a number of groupings of States or confederations, which would express themselves through their own chosen representatives, the whole making a Council of Great States and groups of States.' That, it may be noted, was substantially the practice that came to prevail at Geneva, though there was, of course, there an Assembly of all member States, in addition to a Council consisting of Great Powers and representatives of small; that would be necessary in any European organisation, for all the member States would demand an opportunity of appearing once a year at least in their own right. On only one point does Mr Churchill's conception seem debatable. He assumes that the United States, like Britain and Russia, must not only approve but participate in the European Council. Her membership of it would be of great value, and there is no doubt that for some years after the war she will be taking her full share in many activities in Europe—in the policing of Germany, in refugee relief work, in the operations of U.N.R.R.A., in the promotion of nutrition schemes. But ultimately her place must be in the American Council of the World League, and of course in one of the chief seats of the World League itself. She could hardly be permanently a

member of a European Council. Such a development would never commend itself to American opinion.

It is easy to see broadly, though less easy to see precisely, how the new World League will be built up. Its nucleus will be the mass of institutions, military, economic and humanitarian, which the United Nations have brought into being in the last four and a half years. The United Nations themselves comprise more than half the States of the world and well over three-quarters of its population. Britain, the United States, Russia and China are the natural leaders, and as two of the four are not members of the existing League of Nations it would probably be wise to regard the present League as in liquidation and reconstruct it on much the same basis as before, with all the United Nations as original members. Many of the League's organs—notably its Financial and Economic Section, which has continued its work in America throughout the war, as well as the International Labour Organisation—should be taken over as they stand; if they were abandoned, it would be necessary to recreate them. The work of U.N.R.R.A., which is only meant to be temporary, could without difficulty be coordinated with these or other League organs, and ultimately merged in them when its principal work ends. The developments in the field of agriculture and nutrition projected at the Hot Springs conference of the United Nations in May 1943 were based on proposals originally put forward and discussed at Geneva, and the new League would be the right body to carry them out.

The means by which the armed forces of the United Nations, after disarming Germany and policing Europe in the years immediately after the war, might evolve into an international force under the direction of the new League has already been discussed. As general disarmament progresses, on the lines laid down in the Atlantic Charter, the international force can be gradually reduced in strength, because every national armed force will have been much more considerably reduced.

The original League was well planned, and the tasks allotted to it—supervision of the reduction of armaments, the execution of pledges of mutual assistance in the event of aggression, the promotion of cooperation in labour legislation and financial, commercial, economic, and humanitarian matters—well conceived. A large part of that field is being covered by cooperation between the United Nations. Their purposes and the purposes of any League, new or old, are identical. But a World League must sooner or later include both the neutrals and the enemy States. About the admission of the neutrals there will be no difficulty and need be no delay, but the ex-enemies cannot be admitted till they have given convincing evidence that they are, as the Moscow resolution put it, genuinely 'peace-loving States'. That will not be a matter of weeks or months, but the period of probation may be shortened if confidence is general that their disarmament has been complete and the international force is sufficiently strong to check any impulse toward aggression. The creation of an effective World League, with

continental councils subsidiary to it need not wait for the adhesion of Germany or Japan.

In one respect the new League must, if possible, be an improvement on the old. On the latter was laid the responsibility for effecting the revision of treaties which had become 'inapplicable'. That does not mean merely inconvenient, or burdensome, or distasteful; most treaties concluded at the end of a war are one of those things to the defeated party. But unless preservation of the *status quo* is to be the dominating principle in international relations, some method of revising treaties must be devised. The difficulty of devising one is shown by the fact that though the need has been recognised as long as the League has existed, no satisfactory solution of the problem has been produced. One party to the treaty is *ex hypothesi* against revision, otherwise the treaty would simply be revised by agreement. What form of pressure is to be brought to bear on it—suppose, for example, the State is Britain—and by whom? And how far is the pressure to be carried? Those are questions which the architects of the new League must answer.

CHAPTER VII

WAR CRIMINALS

THE calculated inhumanity—to use the mildest language possible—with which this war has been waged by Germany has inevitably prompted a general resolve that the persons directly responsible for such crimes as the hangings at Kiev, the destruction of Lidice and its inhabitants, the wholesale executions of hostages in France and Norway and Czechoslovakia, the mass murder of the Jews in Poland, the horrors of the gas-vans, shall be brought to trial and pay the appropriate penalty. Englishmen may tend to deprecate this, emphasising unduly the difficulties created by the absence of precedent and any recognised procedure. But Englishmen have not seen their country invaded. It is not on their fellow-countrymen that the atrocities which in this war have signified a relapse into primeval barbarism have been perpetrated. It is worth remembering that on the one occasion on which British soldiers were made the subjects of intolerable treatment by Germany retaliation in kind—the chaining of German prisoners—was immediately ordered. Justice, after all, has its claims. If justice can in practice be flouted with impunity, respect for justice as an ideal will soon vanish. There are admittedly difficulties about bringing war criminals to trial, but they cannot be treated as insuperable till it is proved that they are so.

This is a matter in which the experience of the last war is more useful as an example of the course to avoid than of the course to pursue. The fiasco of the attempt to try the Kaiser is the best demonstration of that. On the face of it there was no doubt something to be said for the proposal. The then Attorney-General, Sir F. E. Smith, made a brilliant case against the Kaiser before the Imperial War Cabinet in November 1918, largely on the ground that when it was proposed to bring the persons responsible for various atrocities and outrages to book it would be a scandal if the man guilty above all of the wanton aggression which brought Britain into the war should go free. Accordingly the peace-makers at Paris included in the Treaty of Versailles an article (227) which ran as follows:

‘The Allied and Associated Powers publicly arraign William II of Hohenzollern, formerly German Emperor, for a supreme offence against international morality and the sanctity of treaties. A special tribunal will be constituted to try the accused, thereby assuring him the guarantees essential to the right of defence. It will be composed of five judges, one appointed by each of the following Powers: namely, the United States of America, Great Britain, France, Italy and Japan.’

Such a procedure was open to every possible objection. It decided summarily the controversial constitutional question of where ultimate responsibility in a country governed like Germany resided—whether with the sovereign or with his Ministers. It decreed proceedings against an offender who was out of the

Allies' reach, safe in an inaccessible asylum in Holland. It charged him with offences ('against international morality and the sanctity of treaties') unknown to any international code, for in fact no international code existed. It constituted an *ad hoc* tribunal, consisting of palpably interested parties—one judge nominated by each of Germany's principal enemies. The whole solemn intention, of course, ended in smoke. The Netherlands Government, being called on to surrender William II of Hohenzollern, replied that it must respect the recognised right of asylum. The ex-Kaiser remained where he was, grew a beard, married a second wife and survived till half-way through the present war. It would be hard to find a better illustration of how proceedings against so-called war criminals should not be undertaken.

But if that procedure is to be abjured, the principle underlying it—that the guilty must pay the penalty of their guilt—most certainly is not. When Lord Birkenhead argued the Kaiser's responsibility before the War Cabinet, the point on which he mainly insisted was not that the Kaiser should be tried but that he should be punished. Between the two alternatives of summary punishment by the Allies as an 'Act of State', as in the case of Napoleon, and formal trial under some *ad hoc* procedure he pretty clearly preferred the former. The chief war-makers this time are far more guilty than the Kaiser, for their personal power was as much greater than his as their deeds have been blacker and more foul. To stage a formal trial of Hitler, who has more blood on his hands than any man in all history, would

be folly beyond all palliation. The Allied leaders should draw up, and no doubt will, a short list of war criminals who have blazoned their own criminality to the world—Hitler and Mussolini and Himmler and Goering and Goebbels and some others—the surrender of whose persons will be demanded, and on whom any penalty deemed to be appropriate will be summarily inflicted. That penalty, it may be suggested, will not necessarily be death. It would be a heavier, and therefore a more fitting, punishment to deport Hitler as a common prisoner to some penal settlement like the Andaman Islands and leave him there to his reflections till his life reached its natural term. Incarceration elsewhere could be provided for his lesser associates; Russia would certainly offer Siberia for their accommodation. The possibility, of course, must be faced that Hitler and some of the others will, like the Kaiser, seek asylum in some neutral country. That makes it necessary to indicate plainly in advance that any country harbouring Hitler or other named criminals will be regarded by the Allies as an accessory after the fact, and be cut off from intercourse with the Allies till it has handed the person or persons over. The Allies, in fact, have not neglected this. In July 1943 the British, American and Russian Governments, in virtually identical declarations, gave formal warnings on this subject to the various neutrals. The essential passage in the British Note, after a reference to the guilt of the Nazi leaders, continued:

‘His Majesty’s Government feel obliged to call on all neutral countries to refuse asylum to any such

persons, and to declare that they will regard any shelter, assistance or protection given to such persons as a violation of the principles for which the United Nations are fighting, and which they are determined to carry into effect by every means in their power.'

In the abnormal conditions created by Hitler's unprecedented guilt such warnings are perfectly reasonable, and now that the Allies have made their intentions known in time the danger of any neutral allowing Hitler across its frontier should be small. It may be not without significance that in May 1944 Switzerland refused entry to Count Volpi, one of Mussolini's principal henchmen.

Other responsibilities are of a different order. Deeds of a bestiality beyond anything known in modern war have been done in this war, and in many cases the authors of them are known. Take, for example, the obliteration of Lidice. That Czech village was suspected of having harboured the assassins of the butcher Heydrich. As a penalty it was razed to the ground; every adult male in it, except two who escaped, was massacred, every woman and child carried off to some form of concentration camp; Lidice ceased to exist. Someone gave the order for this enormity. No elaborate legal procedure is needed for his trial. No penalty could be too heavy for the originator of an action so barbaric. All that is necessary is to be satisfied as to the identity of the accused. The thing was done, that is established; about the nature of the crime and the criminality of its author there can be no argument; once it is certain that the right man or men are in the

dock sentence can be passed forthwith. The one point at issue can be decided, as someone has said, by any tribunal of 'just persons' content very largely to make its procedure as it goes.

That covers a large class of cases. There are others no doubt that will be less simple. In particular, the plea that the accused was simply obeying superior orders will be common. If it were pressed far enough, and accepted, almost everyone except Hitler could claim acquittal. But the plea is generally rejected by jurists. As Lord Birkenhead wrote in November 1918 (in outlining a scheme for the trial of guilty parties in Germany by a 'Grand Court of the Allies'), 'An inferior is protected from the consequences of his act if it is done under such orders of a superior officer as he is legally entitled to give. If the superior is not and cannot be entitled by law to issue such orders, both he and his inferiors are equally guilty.'* That is a hard code, for an inferior in the German army refusing to obey the orders of his superior would be shot out of hand, but the principle is well established, as indeed it must be unless there is to be a wholesale escape of guilty parties. To frame a formally satisfactory legal procedure is not easy, for there exists no international criminal court, no international criminal code and no scale of penalties. The authors of the Treaty of Versailles were perhaps wise when, having elaborated their portentous indictment against the Kaiser, they turned a more practical eye on lesser criminals and

* *Frederick Edwin, Earl of Birkenhead*, by his son, vol. II, chap. VII.

ordained that they should be brought before military tribunals, either inter-Allied or national.* Whatever procedure is approved in the end will have to be largely improvised, and it may not be greatly the worse for that. There is much force in the contention expressed by an eminent jurist, Lord Atkin (in a letter to *The Times*), that it will be well not to be too legalistic; it will be sufficient to draw up a list of crimes about which no decent citizen of any nation could have two opinions—such as the wholesale massacre of civilians, whether hostages or not; wholesale deportations; consignments of women to brothels, and so forth—and have them tried by *ad hoc* tribunals concerned simply with establishing, without any elaborate formalities, whether the accused was in fact the person responsible for the commission of the crime or not.

That proposal need not conflict with the decision on war criminals reached at the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in September 1943. After a reference to the different forms of atrocity committed by the German armies, it was there laid down that,

‘at the time of granting any armistice to any government which may be set up in Germany, those German officers and men and members of the Nazi Party who have been responsible for, or have taken a consenting

* Even that modification went by the board. Germany was allowed instead to try certain war criminals named by the Allies before her own Supreme Court at Leipzig. Of twelve persons accused six were acquitted. The other six were given sentences amounting in sum to 11 years and 10 months, or an average of just under two years. After that all attempt at punishing war criminals was abandoned.

part in, the above atrocities, massacres and executions will be sent back to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done, in order that they may be judged and punished according to the law of these liberated countries and of the free governments that will be erected there.'

This procedure has already been followed on a small scale in the trial at Kharkov of three German officers guilty of foul atrocities while the city was in German hands. All the accused were condemned and publicly hanged; but such trials before the war is over are open to the obvious objection that the enemy can always retaliate against some of the thousands of Allied prisoners he has in his hands.

One criticism that may be, and indeed has been, brought against the Moscow decision is that its adoption would result in the accused persons being tried under national procedures which might differ widely in such matters as rules of evidence and the range of penalties imposable; in some countries, for example, capital punishment has been abolished. The result would be that widely different punishments might be inflicted for the same crimes according to where they might happen to have been committed. That, no doubt, is true, though it is not, perhaps, of great consequence. Some degree of uniformity could be achieved if the Allies drew up, as Lord Atkin suggested, a list of crimes in respect of which action should be taken, with the corollary that no charges outside this category should be brought. There might even be some attempt at the formulation of a scale of penalties;

at any rate to the extent of distinguishing between capital and non-capital charges. With such guidance national courts in different countries might be expected to arrive at substantially similar results. It is too much, of course, to assume that justice would always be done. There is no possibility of devising a procedure that will ensure that. There might be advantages in having all trials conducted by international rather than national tribunals, but the question is not worth considering, since it has been definitely decided otherwise. It must be observed, however, that the Moscow procedure calls for modification, or extension, in one respect, in that it makes no provision for the trial of war crimes committed on enemy territory, German or Italian or Rumanian or Hungarian or Bulgarian or Finnish—as, for example, against prisoners of war*. It would seem necessary either to allow any Allied government against whose nationals such crimes have been committed to demand the surrender to it of the persons inculpated for trial before its national courts, or to set up a special tribunal, necessarily international, for the purpose. Most war crimes have been committed on occupied territory, but there can be no question of ignoring those that have not. Meanwhile a United Nations War Criminals Commission, appointed in October 1943, has been sitting in London, checking the national lists of war criminals and tabulating the names of those accused against whom there appears to be a sound *prima facie* case.

* E.g. the 'cold-blooded butchery' of fifty Allied Air Force officers at Stalag Luft III in March 1944.

CHAPTER VIII

WILL MINORITIES SURVIVE?

THE question of minorities must inevitably be discussed at the next Peace Conference as it was at the last, though minorities may not figure in the main Peace Treaty, any more than they did in the Treaty of Versailles. The part minorities have played as causes of war, or pretexts for war, in Europe needs no demonstration. It was the discontents of the Slav minorities in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, or rather that Empire's fear of its minorities, that served to start the blaze in Europe in 1914, and the Munich crisis is fresh enough in memory to drive deep home a realisation of the use an aggressive Power can make of the grievances, real or pretended, of people of the same race as itself living under an alien sovereignty. Relations between the so-called Sudeten Germans ('so-called' because they had always lived under the Austrian, never under the German, Empire) and the Government of Czechoslovakia were steadily improving till Hitler became Dictator in Germany, and if he had not determined to use them as pawns in the most ambitious game a European politician ever played, Czechoslovakia might in time have presented the world with the spectacle of an aggravated minority-problem satisfactorily solved. As it was, what the Sudeten German complaints, studiously fomented by Hitler, led to was Munich, and the sequel to Munich is the tragedy the world is fighting its way through to-day.

The special provision made for minorities in 1919 and 1920 had a reason. It was a species of *quid pro quo*. By the treaties signed then new States were created and old States enlarged. It was impossible, as it always will be in eastern Europe, to draw frontier lines on a strict basis of nationality; populations in those regions are far too mixed for that. The argument consequently prevailed that when a State acquired a new existence or new territory it should give guarantees for the fair treatment of populations of different race or religion or language which might have, through the exigencies of geography, to be included within its borders. To provide for that minority treaties were drafted, defining the required standards of equitable treatment, with an appeal in case of dispute to the League of Nations. (The League, it may be mentioned, was never consulted about the arrangement, which was imposed on it before its birth.) Poland, Czechoslovakia and many lesser States were required to sign these treaties, which they did with varying degrees of unwillingness. Though the world remembers only the Minority Treaties drafted at the Paris Conference, the principle they embodied was, as M. Clemenceau pointed out, not new. It had been applied frequently in settlements after European wars, more particularly at the Congress of Berlin in 1878, when Servia, Rumania and Montenegro were emancipated from Turkish rule.

It is unnecessary to reproduce the treaty provisions for the protection of minorities in detail here. Broadly speaking what is guaranteed is that minorities in any country whose government has signed a minority

treaty shall enjoy full rights of citizenship without any discrimination, full freedom of worship and the use of their own language in public and private, and in particular in courts of law; that where they form a sufficient proportion of the population provision shall be made for the education of their children in their native tongue; and that a fair share of public appointments, State, provincial and municipal, shall go to minority citizens. On the whole these arrangements have not worked well. Animosities die hard, and most minorities represent a race which, from being dominant, has become subject. That is particularly true of the ex-Germans in Poland, the ex-Austrians in Czechoslovakia and the ex-Hungarians in Rumania. In all these cases the situation was aggravated by the fact that minorities never ceased to make it clear that they considered themselves culturally superior, politically subject though they were. A hostile State within a State can be an awkward thing. Generally speaking, the governments of the countries concerned were galled by being required to sign treaties which they regarded as limitations on their sovereignty, while minorities, adopting a provocatively defensive attitude throughout, looked constantly for redress of their real or imagined grievances not to the League of Nations but to the country to which they were racially akin—Germans in Poland to Germany, Magyars in Rumania to Hungary, and so forth. The Sudeten Germans in Czechoslovakia, though Austrian by origin, looked ceaselessly for championship to Berlin, particularly since the advent of Hitler to power. At the worst

minorities were open fifth columns, working undisguisedly against the governments under which they were compelled to live. This was by no means universally the case, and it is probably true to say that the minority treaties left minorities better off than they—or other minorities—had been before the last war. But certain governments grew increasingly intolerant of the obligations laid on them by the treaties, and matters were brought to a head in 1934 by the Polish Government's official announcement to the League Council that it declined for the future to observe the procedure laid down in the minority treaty Poland had signed in 1919. Such a denunciation of the treaty was completely indefensible, for Poland remained in possession of the territory in consequence of whose acquisition (with the alien population it contained) she had agreed to sign the treaty in the first instance. The League left the matter in abeyance, after protests by Britain and France, and the problem created by Poland's action had not been solved at the date when the march of events put the League itself in abeyance.

Now the minority problem must be considered afresh. Either of two opposing principles can be adopted regarding it—separatism or assimilation. The optimistic assumption at Paris in 1919 was that separatism, with a certain guarantee of rights, would, with goodwill on both sides, lead in time to assimilation or fusion: but it rarely or never happened so. Yet the minority problem is not in fact insoluble. Every form and degree of minority 'protection' can be found exemplified in the British Commonwealth—in Canada,

in South Africa, in New Zealand, and in many non-self-governing dependencies where the problem is never heard of because it gives no trouble; in all these cases there is a clear and recognised distinction, 'racial, religious or linguistic', between the governing Power and the minority. The outstanding example of assimilation is, of course, the United States of America. That great republic has for generations been receiving within its political frontiers ceaseless streams of immigrants of alien race and speech, Slavs and Teutons and Latins and Orientals, on the plain understanding that they were to become American citizens in the fullest sense, speaking the American language, sending their children to the ordinary American schools, claiming no favours and accepting American jurisdiction in every field. By the second generation they are as completely American as the direct descendants of the Pilgrim Fathers so far as acceptance of American citizenship and American institutions go, though a racial vote—the Polish, for example—can still be a factor of some importance in Federal elections. That having been said, it must be added that the example of the United States shows what assimilation can be in ideal conditions. The radical difference between the American and the European problem is that to America the minorities went of their own volition, whereas in Europe they have been transferred to another sovereignty without their consent and against their desire.

And now? Now the whole question must be reconsidered. Theoretically the States that were bound by

the Minority Treaties signed in 1919 and 1920 are bound by them still, for none of them have been formally abrogated; Poland's unilateral denunciation has no legal validity. But there will be no strong disposition after this war to grant special rights to Germans or Italians or Rumanians or Hungarians or Bulgarians anywhere, and the resistance of States like Czechoslovakia and Poland to the perpetuation of measures which they regard as an invasion of their sovereignty will be strong. Their demand will be for the universal recognition of the principle of assimilation; minorities who object to that are always free to migrate, and in some cases might even be assisted to migrate. The conduct of the Sudeten Germans, who were probably better treated than any other minority in Europe, showed how fatal a danger a protected body of dissidents can be to the stability of the State of which they are citizens—if the dissidents are Germans—and Czechoslovakia will no doubt be strongly supported if she demands that any Germans who choose to remain within her borders shall share all the privileges and all the obligations of Czechoslovak citizenship, no discrimination either against them or in their favour being tolerated. They would enjoy the same freedom of speech, freedom of the Press, and freedom of worship as every Czech citizen claims, but not education in their own language in the State schools or any statutory right to use their language in the courts or on public bodies. This would, of course, mean a complete abrogation of the 1919 Minority Treaty, and it follows equally that if that is permitted in

Czechoslovakia's case it must be permitted in every other.

Even so, a minority may be large enough to constitute a danger to the State in which it is embedded. Take Czechoslovakia again as an example. Three million Germans in that State out of a population of thirteen millions are too many. Poland, too, if she acquires most or all of East Prussia—to say nothing of what Mr Churchill calls 'compensation in the west' for the territories she is likely to lose in the east—may find the German proportion of her population too large for safety. In that case the question of expulsion may have to be faced. Hitler, after all, has repeatedly expressed his resolve to see all Germans included in the Reich, and this is a case in which there is something to be said for gratifying his ambition. The migration of Germans homeward may indeed not need to be stimulated. After the atrocities the Germans have perpetrated in Czechoslovakia and Poland it is hard to believe that anyone who looks like a German or talks like one will feel safe in either of those countries for years to come. Moreover, the flight from the two countries before the advancing Russian armies provides a solution in itself, for there is no reason why persons thus 'migrating' for their own safety should be permitted to return. If, contrary to probabilities, enough do remain to constitute a danger to the State, inducements to migration may have to be devised, or measures of compulsion—known euphemistically as transfers of population—carried out. If objection is taken to sending them to Germany on the ground that

Germany is over-populated already, it may be pointed out that Germany's war casualties in dead and disabled will certainly not amount to less than 5,000,000, and that no probable influx of immigrants will reach that figure.

Yet if minorities are no longer to be specifically protected as minorities, something ought to be done if possible to protect human beings as human beings. The need for that in many parts of south-east Europe, where nationalities are inextricably intermingled, is undisputed. Russia, which since the Revolution of 1917 has known no minority problems in spite of her extraordinary amalgam of nationalities, may be able to exert a restraining influence when necessary in a quarter of Europe where her position is bound to be predominant. But it is worth considering whether something could not be effected on a universal scale by at least defining and proclaiming some minimum standard of human rights which no State claiming to be civilised could repudiate. President Roosevelt's Four Freedoms—freedom from fear, freedom from want, freedom of worship and freedom of speech—might form its basis, but the formula would have to be given reasonably concrete application. The proposal for the formulation of a Charter of Human Rights has not so far aroused great enthusiasm, but if a document could be drafted that was practical, reasonable and comprehensive, yet terse, and unanimous approval by the Peace Conference were accorded it, the result would not be negligible. It is true there would be no enforcement by external action, but the public opinion of the

world counts for something, and no nation, particularly no small nation, likes to be pilloried, most of all when conscious of deserving it. There would be no difficulty in observing whether any country's legislation, and its administration in practice, conformed with the standards embodied in the Charter. Aggrieved sections of a population would find means of making their complaints heard, and the external criticisms they would provoke would rarely be without effect on the peccant government. That such a measure would give minorities effective protection can certainly not be claimed, but that they would be better off with it than without it is a reasonable assumption.

No official policy on this question has been concerted between the Allies, and Lord Cranborne, speaking for the Government in a debate on minorities in the House of Lords in March 1944, was unprepared to make any definite statement on the subject. Lord Perth, who spoke from the great knowledge of minority problems which he acquired as Secretary-General of the League of Nations, expressed the view that no government ought to be compelled to tolerate the continuance within its borders of racial minorities likely to develop subversive tendencies. It is worth noting that, while Lord Cranborne emphasised the seriousness of adding the transfer of minority populations to the immense burden of repatriating millions of deportees, the Labour Party, in its peace programme issued in April 1944, took the view that the minority transfer would be so comparatively limited an undertaking that it could quite well be faced.

CHAPTER IX

QUESTION MARKS

ANY discussion of the coming Peace Conference must be disturbingly provisional, for the uncertainties with which the future is invested make any confident prediction folly. Even if we are clear (a considerable assumption) about the line our own country will adopt we are very far from clear about several others. This chapter is being written some six months before the elections, Presidential and Congressional, in the United States. Till that issue is decided America's international policy must remain in grave doubt. Isolation is very far from dead. There have been signs—among them the defeat of Mr Wendell Willkie at the Wisconsin Republican Primaries—of its regaining lost strength. It can hardly be supposed that at this time of day the United States under any administration would go so far as to 'pull out of Europe' completely. Lessons written in letters of blood so staring and so crimson cannot be forgotten altogether. But manifest dissension among the European allies might lead even to that, with consequences disastrous to Europe. After the last war America's decision not to ratify the joint treaty guaranteeing French security, a ratification on which Britain's was dependent, drove the French into a provocative chauvinism born of fear. American absence from the Reparation Commission robbed that body of the preponderance of moderation on which the

British delegation at the Peace Conference had confidently counted. American absence from the League of Nations deprived the League of the sufficiency of authority that would have enabled it to check aggression effectively. America can be relied on to concern herself with Europe during the immediate reconstruction period—the more readily if Britain and the other European Powers are giving her full support in the war against Japan—and it is to be hoped, and can reasonably be believed, that she will, after the war, bear her full responsibility as a member of a World League and of an American Council of that body. But the possibility cannot be completely excluded that she will not.

The next question concerns Russia. Nothing in the whole war has been more astonishing than that great country's military prowess and the disclosure of the vast and unsuspected industrial resources that have made it possible. Hardly less remarkable have been the evidences of Russia's political evolution. The distance that has been travelled since August 1939, when negotiations for an agreement between Russia and Britain broke down, and an agreement between Russia and Germany was signed, is immense. Hitler's stroke of 22 June 1941 was suicidal. It lost him the war, and it will, unless something goes strangely wrong, ensure that after the war his country is kept in rigorous ward. Russia has since 1941 identified herself not only with Europe but with the United States to a degree never before approached since her Revolution. If the signs of her progress are being read aright, consciousness of

nationality is taking precedence in the minds of her citizens over their earlier devotion to what it is fashionable to call an ideology—witness the disbandment of the Comintern, the substitution of a national anthem for the Internationale and the new recognition of the Orthodox Church—and her treaties with Britain and Czechoslovakia, offsetting the unfortunate differences with Poland, bind her firmly into the framework of Europe. She appears to have no undisclosed territorial ambitions, and there is every reason to believe that she will co-operate in making the peace secure, as she has so signally co-operated in making victory certain. The cordiality displayed by the Russian statesmen at the Moscow and Teheran conferences was genuine.

Yet Russia has for so long been so inscrutable that foreigners hesitate to claim that they fully understand her yet. Her diplomacy tends occasionally to take sudden and disconcerting turns, and the importance to be attached to kites flown by what is a strictly controlled Press can never quite be estimated. In any survey of the future there is one contingency that cannot be ignored. If Germany went to pieces, and the only party to assert itself there were the Communist—at least a possibility, if not so much as a probability—and the support of Russia were sought in the name of a common creed, what response would the appeal evoke in Moscow, and what, if the response were favourable, would be the effect on Europe? Would there be a Russo-German entente, or even alliance, on a new basis? These questions must be left unanswered, for

no material for a reliable answer exists. The situation may never arise. There is no reason why Communists should gain control in Germany: whether they do or not may depend largely on the handling of the immediate post-war settlement by the Allies as a whole. And even if German Communism did gather strength, Russia in her present temper might be a steadying rather than a subversive influence. She is today more of a Socialist than a Communist State, and her movement is rather away from than towards the Left. She shows every sign of valuing her association on completely equal terms with Powers like Britain and the United States, and her aversion from a German Communist because he is a German promises to exceed considerably any sympathy she might feel with his Communism. All it is necessary to remember is that in spite of a welcome growth of mutual understanding, the West has not yet completely fathomed the Russian mind.

Finally, so far as the Allied Powers are concerned, there is France. Regarding her it must be a case as yet of confidence rather than of full assurance. She has passed through an experience without precedent in her history, its first stage catastrophic defeat in war, its second the occupation of her whole native soil by the enemy, the third the division of the France of 1939 into three, or even four, severed sections—Vichy France, Resistance France, the Committee of National Liberation at Algiers and (though it fully acknowledges the Committee) the colonial empire. The only political and psychological conflict here is between

Vichy France and the rest, but among the rest geographical divisions cannot be ignored. There is contact between the Algiers Committee and Resistance France, but at the moment these lines are being written it is not a satisfactory or sufficient contact, and cannot be; but the march of events may soon change that. Nor are divisions at Algiers unknown, though they are diminishing. A strong and united France is essential to the stability of Europe, but whether that is the France the world will see when the soil of France is freed who knows? Purification by suffering is no imaginary process, and it is legitimate to believe that France is experiencing it today. But belief cannot be converted into certainty yet. We cannot forget that there has been no stable government, as Britons or Americans count stability in government, in France for twenty years. There may be the nucleus of one in the Committee of National Liberation, but that body contains no outstanding personalities, with the possible exception of General de Gaulle, whose political experience till he started the Free French movement had been negligible, and no member who had ever held higher office than an Under-Secretaryship. Resistance France may supply the man, the spirit and the resolve, and what is a less common quality, the ability. It is in that belief and on that assumption that France's Allies pin their faith on the France of tomorrow. But the question mark must remain for some time yet.

Germany, of course, is one vast interrogation, so much so that speculation can lead nowhere. The funda-

mental vice of a regime like Hitler's is that it destroys anything that might replace it. For ten years and more democratic institutions in Germany have ceased to function. There has been no training in democratic method. Political discussion has been smothered. The very material for political study has been withdrawn. No new political leaders, other than Nazi, have been produced, or could be, and the old leaders have disappeared. It is doubtful whether a single one of them will count for anything in the post-war Germany. Emigrés, however blameless, are rarely popular on their return; it seems unlikely in this case, at any rate, that they will be. Someone must be found to assume responsibility in Germany. The army may have some contribution to make in that sphere; so may the Churches, both Protestant and Roman Catholic. There may be some efficient burgomasters who would fit a larger sphere. But on all that there is no real ray of light; in such circumstances speculation is idle. Through it all the Allies' purpose must be resolutely maintained. It is no part of their policy to destroy Germany, once they have destroyed the militarism that has brought her and all Europe to the edge of annihilation. She must be free to live and trade and thrive. But there can be no premature or indolent leniency. The watchword when any infraction of the coming treaty is suspected must be *obsta principiis*.

I append, without comment, two quotations. In his book *Europe and the German Question* (first published, in German, in 1937), Professor F. W. Foerster, the well-known German historian, wrote: 'How characteristic that reply of the German diplomat during

the War [the 1914-18 war] to a neutral who, in view of the outrages committed in the German conduct of the war, asked whether the Germans did not consider the possibility of defeat. "In that case we shall organise sympathy". In March 1944 there was published in London the translation of a secret memorandum by General von Stuelpnagel, Chief of the German Military Administration in France, which fell into the hands of the French clandestine journal *Combat*. Its salient paragraph defines German post-war policy thus: 'We need not be afraid of the peace-terms with which we are being threatened, for the enemy coalition will always be disunited and split into several camps. We must do our utmost to ensure that the open antagonisms between our enemies are somehow expressed in the peace-terms. The 1919 formula, "Germany must pay", has been recognised as senseless and valueless even by our enemies. We shall place a few workers at our enemies' disposal for the reconstruction of their devastated territories, and we shall surrender our old machinery. We shall wear out our enemies by our tactics in negotiation, and initiate a propaganda campaign appealing to humanitarian sentiments and the sympathy of the world.'

Such are the tactics the Germans can be counted on to pursue. How will they be received? In his essay on John Hampden Macaulay wrote: 'The English are always inclined to side with a weak party which is in the wrong rather than with a strong party which is in the right.'

Always?

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